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1Introduction
         Brian Blouet writes that the last 150 years were a constant struggle between the 
processes of geopolitics and globalization, a struggle between ‘geopolitical states who wanted 
to close off and control earth space, resources and population and globalizing ones who 
wished to open up the world to the free flow of ideas, goods and services.’1 According to 
Blouet the world we live today is a result of the clash between these tendencies, with the 
post-Cold War –arrangements heralding the triumphant dominance of globalization 
tendencies over geopolitical thinking and the possible end of geopolitics.
         Another group of analysts proclaim the coming end of globalization and the rebirth of 
geopolitical thinking as a result of strengthened border controls against drug trafficking and 
immigration and ‘deterritorialized permanent dangers’ as an implication of recent terrorist 
threats.
         However in the EU context, for example, the strengthening of outside borders is 
accompanied with intensification of internal integration processes. Therefore even if such 
emerging geopolitical thinking persists in the future it will be part of an integrated blocs’ 
external policy, while integration will continue to be the dominant internal paradigm. 
Therefore even if we account for some deficiencies of Blouet’s theory, it is still largely valid 
for the processes, taking place in the internal EU’s policies.
         In the new geopolitical post-Cold War order the Balkans are included in the Euro-
Atlantic system, and thus strongly influenced by integration and globalization processes. In 
such a political and economical framework, the present international regimes provide scope 
2for intensive policy coordination and cooperation among Balkan states, as a consequence of 
the growing interdependence. These countries' institutions have to perform 'patterns of 
practice' consistent with the new political and economical order. 
         Furthermore most of the Balkan countries are in a different stage of their negotiations 
for accession into the European Union and NATO. At the pan-European Conference of 
Transport Ministers in Helsinki in 1997, fifty-two countries decided to plan the building of 
ten multimode corridors, in order to connect the EU’s Trans European Networks (TEN) with 
the infrastructure of Eastern Europe.2 This initiative aimed at supporting the acceding 
countries’ economy stabilization and facilitating the establishment of the future common 
European market. These corridors should comprise of road, rail, oil, gas and 
telecommunication connections.
         Considering the strategic location between three continents, it is no surprise that six out 
of all ten multimodal corridors pass through the Balkan Peninsula region. However despite 
the numerous attempts and initiatives by the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, the EU, 
the European Investment Bank and other institutions concerned, aimed to accelerate the 
completion of these corridors, there has not been much substantial action taken in that 
direction. After a decade most of the projects are still in their infancy-stage. Seemingly there 
is a facilitating political framework with democratic governments in all Balkan countries and 
generous access to funding from the EIB, EU and other institutions. So, where do the 
obstacles come from?
                                                                                                                                                       
1
Critics on Brian Blouet, Geopolitics and Globalization in the Twentieth Century, available at
http://www.reaktionbooks.co.uk/titles/globa_geopolitics.html; Internet; accessed June 2003.
2 TINA Vienna: Transport Strategies, ‘The Network’ available from http://www.tinavienna.at/tnetz.htm; Internet; updated 
March 2003,  accessed March 23, 2003
3         The research focuses on how present Balkan political elites declare that they would 
adhere to the values of integrating and globalizing Europe in their Balkan policy, while de 
facto employing the ‘arsenal’ of geopolitical egoistic planning.
          I also argue that narrow geopolitical planning in inter-Balkan relations, which is 
embedded in the geopolitical thinking of present Balkan political elites, obstructs the 
democratization and economic recovery of these societies.
         The terms ‘narrow geopolitical planning’ or ‘egoistic geopolitical planning’ are used 
above in the sense of Balkan political elites, employing strategies much more consistent with 
Blouet’s geopolitics and Haushofer’s discredited Geopolitik of the 1930’s, rather than modern 
and global-structures-oriented Geopolitique or the Globalization concept, which are supposed 
to be the predominant present paradigm in democratic societies.
         Is there something particular that makes Balkan political elites so stubborn and 
suspicious to each other in regards with the implementation of the big pan-European 
infrastructure projects? 
         Probably the main reason for such state of affairs is the very large geopolitical stake 
involved in the transport and energy-infrastructure routes. Balkan countries set great hopes in 
the construction of large-scale pan-European infrastructure projects, ‘believed to help them 
get out of their state of crisis as it was the case in the US and Germany in the 1930's’ 
following the Great Depression.3
         Another argument explains the political obstruction with geopolitical interests of 
external actors. This is most certainly evidenced in the alternative oil pipeline projects, where 
the US supports financially and politically the AMBO project, Russia –the Burgas-
Alexandroupolis route and the EU the Trieste-Constanta project.
                                                
3
 ‘The Place of the second bridge over the Danube in the Bulgarian-Romanian Relations’, available at 
http://www.omda.bg/engl/news/comment/brige1307.htm, Internet; accessed May, 2003.
4         This research also indicates historical legacy as a possible variable. The research 
explores some present policy aspects, which support the finding that historical legacy might 
still have some influence on Balkan elites, by inspecting the region’s historical doctrines, 
present transport and energy strategies. However it also takes into account the difficulties 
from the fact that such documents are usually not officially published, or published in very 
limited quantities. Operationalization of such a variable as historical legacy is also a 
significant challenge.
         Very often external actors perceive Balkan lack of cooperation as rooted in historical 
prejudices, mutual mistrust and vivid stereotypes. However the argument in this research is 
completely different. Irrationality is regarded, not as a consequence of ‘ancient hatreds’ and 
genetic predisposition, but in relation to the current political and economical context. In this 
sense it is truly irrational for Balkan countries not to cooperate in the present strongly 
cooperation-facilitating international regime with so many obvious benefits arising from 
eventual cooperation and EU integration. 
         The aim of this research is not to argue that ‘geopolitical egoistic’ foreign policy is 
fundamentally irrational in an era of globalization. Instead the focus is on the particular 
historical, geographical and political context. Although it is a fact that even in the most Euro-
committed countries, politicians are concerned both with absolute and relative gains, in 
situations when ‘the policies followed by one government are regarded by its partners as 
facilitating realization of their own objectives, as the result of a process of policy 
coordination’4, cooperation is usually achieved. The research focuses on how present Balkan 
political elites still prefer to think in the logic of relative gains, despite the cooperation-
facilitating international regimes.
                                                
4 Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony.
5         In order to explore that Balkan ‘phenomenon’ of immense rivalry, albeit widely 
proclaimed cooperation, this research focuses on eight case-analysis. First four cases observe 
how local political elites perceive the pan -European multimodal corridors crossing the region 
as sources of fierce competition, rather than the officially declared intra-regional cooperation, 
which was the major objective for their adoption. The other four cases explore similar 
rivalries in the energy sector, where couple of years before the adoption of a regional energy 
market, there is an immense competition for the leading place on the market. Also the routes 
of the pipeline projects that should transport Caucasian oil to Europe are highly contested 
issues. 
         The reason for selection of transport and energy infrastructure projects for the aims of 
this research is that the pan-European corridors were one of the main initiatives aiming at 
supporting the Balkan countries’s economy stabilization and facilitating their economical, 
political and cultural integration into the Euro-Atlantic space. Thus the consequent gridlock 
of the projects due to geopolitical planning, albeit mutual interests, facilitating international 
regimes and proclaimed EU commitment, makes the case worth exploring. The specific case 
selection within the larger framework of energy and transport sector was not very 
complicated since nearly all pan-European infrastructure projects  in the Balkans encountered 
a situation of discord largely due to obstruction of neighboring countries.                  .
       My first chapter will start with a section that identifies the main arguments in the 
globalization-geopolitics discussion and briefly introducing Blouet’s theory. This is followed 
by a section on the main developments of geopolitics as a scientific discipline: from the 
theories of Rudolf Kjéllen and Friedrich Ratzel, through nazi-associated Geopolitik to 
modern global-concern Geopolitique. By exploring the historical development of geopolitical 
science the research aims to indicate that the old geopolitics' methods (1930's) clash with the 
concept we today define as 'globalization'.  On the contrary, the new geopolitics (that 
6emerged in 1970s) is consistent with globalization. Such an overview introduces to the fact 
that present Balkan countries' foreign policies employ geopolitical methods, consistent with 
the old geopolitics and clashing with the globalizing world's philosophy (and with the new 
geopolitics). The second section of the first chapter will deal with the collapse of the old 
communist geopolitical order and the new emerging international regime. The third section of 
the first chapter will concentrate on the place of the Balkan region in the new geopolitical 
order with subsections devoted to the role of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe 
(SPSEE) and the Transport Infrastructure Needs Agency (TINA), as the backbone initiatives, 
aimed at the political, economic and cultural reintegration of the region to the Euro-Atlantic 
geopolitical space.
         The second chapter explores in depth the Balkan rivalries in the Transport sector, 
scrutinizing different cases, and namely the conflict between Transport Corridor VIII and Via 
Egnatia, the geopolitical battle over the place of the second Danube bridge on the route of 
Corridor IV, the competition among countries on the routes of Corridor IV and Corridor X, as 
well the controversial interest surrounding the opening of new border point between Bulgaria 
and Greece, where suddenly brown bears emerged as leading political actors.
         Similarly third chapter explores the immense competition in the energy sector among 
Balkan countries’ political elites, and the negative economic consequences of such clash of 
interests. The first section of the chapter scrutinizes the ‘Nuclear Wars’ between Bulgaria and 
Romania for the leading regional energy-export position, and namely the Kozloduy vs. 
Cernavoda Nuclear Plants conflict. The second section analyses the ‘dawn of a new Middle 
East’ in the Caucasus and Central Asia region and the alternative Balkan pipeline projects 
that should transit the oil to western markets. Again each state lobbies for its ‘own’ project, 
disregarding economic efficiency, technical parameters and competitive advantages of other 
countries’ project. The consequence of such rivalry is that up to date neither project is 
7commissioned, which supports the findings that Balkan antagonism obstructs the economic 
development and modernization of the respective societies.
8Chapter 1
Geopolitics vs. Globalization or Geopolitics and 
Globalization
         As Paul Claval wrote in 1994, geopolitics is ‘à la mode’ again. In a seemingly post-
communist, post-ideological and post-confrontation world, geopolitics has somehow 
‘comfortably’ returned into scientific and practical discourse as ‘reflection on geopolitical 
and geostrategic problems [became] more than ever essential’.5  This is happening at the 
same time as Gearóid Tuathail wrote  ‘it is now something of a cliche to assert that we live in 
an era of transition between a dying Old World order and the birth of a New World order.’6
However there is not a single correct answer where such transition might lead to.
         Some like Alvin Toffler and Michael Finley predict that humanity is gradually entering 
into its Third Wave of change, where the Third Wave of ‘information capitalism... will 
establish a completely new order of norms, values, behaviors and even subjects’7, replacing 
the civilization paradigm, established after the ‘Second Wave of industrial revolution some 
300 years ago.’8  It is also a transition from ‘a brute force’ to a ‘brain force’ economy9, from 
                                                
5 Geoffrey Parker, Geopolitics: Past, Present and Future (London and Washington: Pinter, 1998) , 1, quoting Paul Claval, 
Géopolitique et Géostrategie (Paris: Éditions Nathan, 1994)
6
 Gearóid Ó Tuathail, ‘At the End of Geopolitics? Reflections on a Plural Problematic at the Century’s End’ , 
available at http://www.majbill.vt.edu/Geog/faculty/toal/papers/End.htm; Internet; accessed June, 2003, 
(capitalization mine).
7
 Gearóid Ó Tuathail, ‘At the End of Geopolitics?.
8
 Alvin and Heidi Toffler, What is the Third Wave?, available at 
http://www.toffler.com/thethirdwave/default.shtml; Internet; accessed June, 2003, (capitalization mine).
9
 Alvin and Heidi Toffler, What is the Third Wave?.
9mass-production by centralized, hierarchical, bureaucratic institutions to ‘de-centralized, de-
massified, diversified, virtual organizations with distributed decision making.’10
         Second group of analysts believe11 that humanity is approaching ‘the end of 
civilization’ with the legitimization of ‘liberal democracy as a system of 
government...[emerging] throughout the world over the past few years, as it conquered rival 
ideologies like hereditary monarchy, fascism, and most recently communism.’12 Francis 
Fukuyama further writes that ‘liberal democracy may constitute the ‘end point of mankind's 
ideological evolution’ and the ‘final form of human government,’ and as such constituted the 
‘end of history.’’13
         Such a stance is ardently opposed by the structuralism and dependency theory 
proponents, who argue that there is an urgent need for change in the existing neoliberal 
paradigm, as it cannot provide solution for the growing inequalities between center and 
periphery and also that the ‘triumph of a fully neoliberal world order is impossible in a 
decentered, polyglot world of emergent anarchy and pervasive indifference.’14 But it must be 
noted that even they position ‘the problems of underdevelopment and development within a 
global context.’15
         However where all approaches meet is their acknowledgement of the epochal 
economic, political and social transformation processes the world is witnessing in the last 
decades of the twentieth century. Such processes are classified under the rather general term 
‘globalization’.    Although it is hard to be classified, Globalization as a trend  ‘implies that a 
                                                
10
 Fleming, ‘Creating a New Civilization’, available at http://www.worldtrans.org/whole/createnewciv.html; 
Internet; accessed June, 2003.
11
 Gearóid Ó Tuathail, ‘At the End of Geopolitics?.
12
 Francis Fukuyama, introduction to ‘The End of History and the Last Man’, (Penguin, 1992)
13
 Ibid.
14
 Gearóid Ó Tuathail, ‘At the End of Geopolitics?.
10
greater interdependence is happening among different regions and countries in world in terms 
of finances, trade and communications.’16 Giovanni E. Reyes writes that as a theory of 
economic development ‘one of its major assumptions is that a greater level of integration is 
taking place among different regions of the world, and that this integration is having an 
important impact on economic growth and social indicators.’17 At a top political and 
economic level, globalization is the process of denationalization of markets, politics and legal 
systems, i.e., the rise of the so-called global economy.18 Gearóid Ó Tuathail writes that 
‘globalization is best conceptualized as the transcendence of the territoriality of state 
capitalism, its boundaries, regimes, and horizons, but not territoriality itself.’19 Going back to 
the argument that in the era of globalization, geopolitics is  ‘à la mode’ again, a logical 
question arises: Is there any controversy between geopolitical thinking and the Globalization 
concept? 
         For some analysts the answer most certainly is ‘yes’, as they believe that there is an 
intense clash between the two concepts and they are mutually exclusive: while Geopolitics 
glorifies the importance of spatial dimensions to the functioning of a state, the latter heralds 
‘the death’ of geography. Paul Virilio and more recently, James Der Derian write about ‘the 
eclipse of geopolitics’ by ‘chronopolitics’ or the ‘politics of time.’20 Furthermore Virilio 
proclaims the ‘strategic value of territory’, being replaced by the ‘emergent strategic value of 
                                                                                                                                                       
15
Cristobal Kay and Robert Gwynne, Relevance of Structuralist and Dependency Theories in the Neoliberal 
Period: A Latin American Perspective.” The Journal of Developing Societies, 16(1): 49-69(2000).
16
 Giovanni  Reyes, ‘Theory of Globalization: Fundamental Basis’, available at 
http://sincronia.cucsh.udg.mx/globaliz.htm; Internet; accessed June, 2003.
17
 Ibid.
18
 ‘Introduction to Globalization’, available at 
http://www.globalization.com/index.cfm?MyCatID=1&PageID=1321; Internet; accessed June 2003.
19
 Gearóid Ó Tuathail, abstract to The Postmodern Geopolitical Condition: States, Statecraft, and Security at 
the Millennium, available at http://www.majbill.vt.edu/geog/faculty/toal/papers/millennium.htm; Internet; 
accessed June 2003.
11
telemetricality’, associated with chronopolitics. Brian Blouet also discusses about ‘The Cold 
War and the Triumph of Geopolitics’ and ‘ Globalization and the Death of Geopolitics?’21 He 
also writes that the last 150 years were a constant struggle between the processes of 
geopolitics and globalization, a struggle between ‘geopolitical states who wanted to close off 
and control earth space, resources and population and globalizing ones who wished to open 
up the world to the free flow of ideas, goods and services.’22 According to Blouet the world 
we live today is a result of the clash between these tendencies, with the post-Cold War –
arrangements heralding the triumphant dominance of globalization tendencies over 
globalization thinking and the possible end of geopolitics.
         As Gearóid Ó Tuathail wrote other group of analysts believe that humanity is 
witnessing a transition from geopolitics to geo-economics: ‘ [states] impelled by the 
bureaucratic urges of role-preservation and role-enhancement [want] to acquire a ‘geo-
economic’ substitute for their decaying geopolitical role’. For others the transition is from 
geopolitics to ecopolitics: ‘Ecology has become ‘the new sacred agenda’ which requires a 
new faith in the future of life on earth and ‘a new reverence for absolute principles that can 
serve as guiding stars by which to map the future course of our species.’’ Yet others believe 
that there is an evolution from geopolitics to geo-governance: ‘The dilemma of global 
politics is no longer geopolitics but geogovernance, the ongoing and often unhappy struggle 
to establish workable governance structures at the global scale.’23 What is common for all of 
them is not only that geopolitics and globalization are not mutually exclusive but also the 
latter is the gradual evolution of the former. In this respect globalization might also be 
                                                                                                                                                       
20Timothy Luke and Gearóid Ó Tuathail, ‘Thinking Geopolitical Space: The Spatiality of War, Speed and Vision in the 
Work of Paul Virillo’ in Thinking Space , ed. Mike Crang and Nigel Thrift (New York and London: Routledge, 1998)
21 Brian Blouet,  Geopolitics and Globalization in the Twentieth Century (London: Reaktion books, 2001)
22
Critics on Brian Blouet, Geopolitics and Globalization in the Twentieth Century, available at
http://www.reaktionbooks.co.uk/titles/globa_geopolitics.html; Internet; accessed June 2003.
23
 Gearóid Ó Tuathail, ‘At the End of Geopolitics?.
12
regarded as the end of modern geopolitics and the birth of post-modern geopolitics, where the 
‘‘postmodern geopolitical condition’ is rendering the spatial imaginations associated with 
modern state-centric geopolitics increasingly redundant (though they remain in 
use).24Geoffrey Parker writes about the new global-scale oriented geopolitique, that replaced 
the nazi Geopolitik and Cold-War geopolitics. 25
         Third group of analysts and policy-makers write that along with the many advantages 
globalization brings, it also poses significant threats. After the initial excitement of  ‘less 
states’, falling borders and integrating markets, the dangers from such development also 
became evident. As Gearóid Ó Tuathail writes this is evidenced by the new ‘rhetoric of 
President Clinton's administration’26 in the mid-nineties of the twentieth century 
‘We are all...vulnerable to the reckless acts of rogue states and to an unholy axis of 
terrorists, drug traffickers and international criminals. These twenty-first-century 
predators feed on the very free flow of information and ideas and people we cherish. 
They abuse the vast power of technology to build black markets for weapons, to 
compromise law enforcement with huge bribes of illicit cash, to launder money with the 
keystroke of a computer. These forces...are our enemies’ 27
 Such perception of a ‘world of deterritorialized dangers grounded in certain territorial ‘rogue 
states’28 opens the door for the triumphant return of the geopolitical thinking. The terrorist 
attacks in the United States from September 11 further strengthened this tendency.
         The same process is witnessed in Western Europe, where initially the creation of a 
common market eased the liquidation of nationalistic sentiments in the respective societies 
and the pursuit for self-sufficiency of the national economies. However the more integration 
processes advance within the union itself, the more it becomes close to external actors. The 
                                                
24
 Gearóid Ó Tuathail, The Postmodern Geopolitical Condition.
25 Geoffrey Parker, Geopolitics: Past, Present and Future (London and Washington: Pinter, 1998), 10.
26
 Gearóid Ó Tuathail, The Postmodern Geopolitical Condition.
27
 Ibid.
13
new EU external borders should guard against drug trafficking, poor immigrants, 
international terrorism. Illegal immigrants and crime revived nationalism in some Western 
societies. In this aspect globalization has contributed to the rebirth of geopolitical thinking.
         Fourth group of analysts goes even further proclaiming the coming end of globalization. 
Harold James in his book ‘The End of Globalization’ explores ‘the circumstances in which 
the globally integrated world of an earlier era broke down under the pressure of unexpected 
events’29, and namely the Great Depression. James writes that the demise of the first global 
economy ‘was not simply a consequence of the strains of World War I but resulted from the 
interplay of resentments against all these elements of mobility, as well as from the policies 
and institutions designed to assuage the threats of globalism.’30 James makes parallel to the 
recent world’s developments and poses the question-is humanity witnessing the beginning of 
the end of globalization. Stephen Kobrin writes that trade wars, the rise of regional blocs, 
opposition to immigration and increased border controls, as well as the terrorist attacks might 
well be first signs of the ‘end of the second global economy.’31
         In this research on Balkan infrastructure rivalries, geopolitics and globalization are 
regarded within the theoretical framework of Brian Blouet, who heralds the recent triumph of 
globalization tendency over geopolitics after more than a century of intensive rivalry. On the 
contrary, the proponents of the ‘end of globalization’ theory argue that increased border 
control as a consequence of international crime and illegal trafficking are signs of the decline 
of globalization. However in the EU context, for example, the strengthening of outside 
                                                                                                                                                       
28
 Ibid.
29
 Harold James, The End of Globalization: Lessons from the Great Depression  
(Harvard University Press, 2001)
30
 Ibid.
31
 Stephen Kobrin , The End of Globalization? , Presentation for Geopolitics Course at the Wharton School , 
University of Pennsylvania, available at  
http://www.management.wharton.upenn.edu/kobrin/Course%20Material/Geopolitics%20Sp%2003/geo03Sp3ab
w.pdf; Internet; accessed June 2003.
14
borders is accompanied with intensification of internal integration processes. Therefore I 
believe that even if such emerging geopolitical thinking persists in the future it will be part of 
integrated blocs’ external policy, while globalization will continue to be the dominant 
internal paradigm. Therefore even if we account for some deficiencies of Blouet’s theory, it is 
still largely valid for the processes, taking place in the internal EU’s policies. Related to the 
Balkan context, the region’s countries, which are in very advanced EU-accession stage 
should in observable future will be part of the globalization paradigm: free movement of 
people, goods and money, as well as part of the common market and economy. According to 
Blouet’s framework, all Balkan political elites that have declared that they would adhere to 
the Euro-Atlantic values of integration and internationalization, should have left behind the 
traces of geopolitical thinking and open up to the free flow of ideas, goods and services 
between acceding Balkan countries. However despite their opening towards the EU, Balkan 
countries still prefer to ‘close off and control earth space, resources and population’ among 
themselves, which is consistent with Blouet’s old geopolitical thinking tendency, as well as 
with the concepts of Ratzelian Geopolitik and Cold War geopolitics. This is evidenced from 
the rivalries along the routes of the pan –European infrastructure projects that pass through 
the region. That is why some authors started to write about ‘The Balkan geopolitical 
competition called ‘Balkan cooperation.’
 1.1 Geopolitical Science: From Discredited Geopolitik to ‘à la mode’32
Geopolitique
         The etymology of the word geopolitics comes from Greek Geia and polis: the goddess 
of the earth and the city-state of ancient Greece respectively.33  Therefore it could be derived 
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that geopolitics explores the terrestrial forms and space of the Earth and the control and 
organization of it by humankind.34 The relationship between man and nature have been 
studied since the times of Aristotle, who wrote ‘There are many things that make men good 
and virtuous; these are nature, habit, rational principle.’ 35
         According to Bertil Haggman, geopolitics is the ‘study of the international [political] 
scene from a spatial or geocentric viewpoint, the understanding of the whole being the 
ultimate object and justification.’36
         The term Geopolitics (Geopolitik in Swedish and German) was first developed by 
Rudolf Kjéllen (1866-1922) at the turn of the twentieth century in his book Introduction to 
Swedish Geography.37 His most important work, related to Geopolitics is The State as a 
Living Form, published in 1916. Kjéllen was strongly influenced by Friedrich Ratzel (1844-
1904), Professor of Geography at the University of Munich, who first explored the synthesis 
of human and natural phenomena and published his Politische Geographie in 1897, which is 
believed to be ‘the seminal work in modern political geography.’38
         Since that moment Geopolitics has always been regarded as a study, bordering on 
Political Science, Geography, International Relations and History with a predominance of the 
former two. Geoffrey Parker even writes that ‘Geopolitics had a divided parentage-political 
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science and geography- and from the outset both disciplines tended to regard it as being a sort 
of illegitimate child of the other.’39
         Ratzel and Kjéllen believed in the organic theory of the state, and namely that the state, 
possessing many features similar to that of living organisms, had to ‘adjust to his 
environment in the same way as flora and fauna.’40 State roots were in the land and 
environment played a vital role. In order to grow, a state had to expand ‘if it is to be a healthy 
[organism]’ and also that ‘the growing state would tend to absorb less successful 
ones.’41Such ideas made the emerging science susceptible, in the later decades, to 
appropriation by political elites for unclear ‘purposes that lie beyond the pursuit of 
knowledge.’42
         Indeed Geopolitics or Political Geography (how some preferred to denote it) evolved 
dramatically in the next four decades since it was first developed. The beliefs of Kjéllen were 
that geopolitics should be a science ‘used to designate the determining influence of 
environment on the politics of a nation’43, but the implementation of geopolitics into Nazi 
Germany’s National Socialist’s Doctrine in the Second World War brought an immense 
discredit to the Geopolitical Science. 
         The deviance of Political Geography into the new fascist Geopolitik could be traced to 
Karl Haushofer and his journal Zeitschrift für Geopolitik (1924). Parker writes that the 
purpose of that journal was to examine ‘the geopolitical elements of the German situation 
with a view to altering them to Germany’s advantage.’44
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         In 1976, the new geographical journal Hérodote, edited in Paris was the first sign that 
issues, exploring the relation between spatial and political dimensions are gradually returning 
into scientific and scholarly discourse. In 1983, Hérodote was subtitled ‘Revue de géographie 
et de géopolitique’45(Geographical and Geopolitical Review). Its objective was ‘to use the 
spatial methodology to understand the issues better and to facilitate more effective action.’46
Furthermore Hérodote -circle propagated that the new géopolitique should be distant from the 
old statist approach, while concentrating on global issues such as environmental protection 
and ecology, world poverty and ‘the using up of finite resources.’47 Such a stance would 
allow for the reevaluated science to be much more objective and to overcome the egoistic 
self-state-centered perspective of the traditional Geopolitik. Parker wrote that géopolitique 
‘emerged as one of the manifestations of a new earth-consciousness and the one which 
treated political phenomena as being essentially environmental in their implications and part 
of a multi-dimensional and holistic human world.’48
         Ratzelian and Kjellen’s theories considered the state as the ultimate level of 
organization, with state representing ‘stability, order and purpose’ without which there would 
be an inevitable ‘slide into chaos.’49 Their ideas were inspired by Hegel’s nation-state 
representing ‘the highest form of political existence, embodying as it did the common 
purposes and aspirations.’50 As Parker claims this was the philosophical basis that justified 
state’s interest concern of the early geopolitical science. 
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         The end of the Cold War and the present paradigm of integration and globalization 
position deprived the nation state of its ‘sacrosanct position.’51 As Parker wrote there is a 
clear interest in ‘other levels of organisation’52-lower and higher. Geopolitique consistent 
with the global approach could finally transform it from ‘a discipline of war to a discipline of 
peace.’53
         The overview of the historical development of geopolitical science from discredited 
Geopolitik to a global-concept Geopolitique aimed to introduce a framework in this research, 
to which subsequently, the specific Balkan context would be related. Most western societies 
have adopted the global-structure-concept for the relation between space and polity. ‘Space-
bounded’ countries had dissolved to give way to the notion of boundless European space. 
This global vision of a state as a part of bigger geographical space and the whole Earth is the 
main philosophy behind the new geopolitical understanding and the geopolitics 
(geopolitique), that emerged in the late 1970’s Hérodote’s circle. 
         On the contrary, in the Balkans, despite the widely but hypocritically proclaimed 
dedication to the values of integrating and globalizing Europe, these political elites are de 
facto employing the ‘full arsenal’ of geopolitical egoistic planning in their Balkan policy, 
which is consistent with the Ratzelian Geopolitik. As Gergana Dimitrova54 wrote ‘own’ 
location in the Balkans is perceived by indigenous elites as ‘source of welfare and economic 
gains’, ‘as exceptionally rare and attractive endowment that could boost the 
country’s...importance in the eyes of the more economically advanced world and thus 
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encourage accelerated EU and NATO integration.’ Thus geography is used as a strategic 
weapon against other countries: by trying to diminish neighbors’ location, political elites 
promote their ‘own’ location. The fierce geographical rivalry, which is scrutinized in the 
second and third chapters, is even more irrational in the light of the fact that today’s ardent 
contestants are tomorrow’s EU full-member states. 
1 .2 Collapse of the Old Geopolitical Order and the Emergence of New ‘Geo-
systems’55 in Eurasia
      The collapse of the Soviet geopolitical system at the end of the twentieth century 
initiated radical geopolitical transformation processes in vast regions of Europe and Asia. The 
bi-polar confrontation-world-of-yesterday had forever dissolved to give way to a completely 
new international regime. 
         Neither the political, nor the spatial understanding of the world would ever be the same, 
as used to be in the last fifty years. The new emerging geopolitical order challenged the 
traditional scholarship, numerous analyses, national doctrines and strategies in every sphere, 
developed for decades by academia, scientific institutes, think tanks, governmental and non-
government agencies. For example generations have studied Montblan as the highest peak in 
Europe but recent geography textbooks proclaim 5,642m- mount Elbrus in the Caucasus as 
the highest elevation in Europe.56
         As a result of the dismemberment of the USSR, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, (and 
the unification of Germany), twenty-seven new sovereign states appeared on the political 
map of Europe and Asia. As a result of this, Ioannis Loukas wrote that the idea for 
‘broadening of the Euro-Atlantic space to the East’57 was followed by a process of intensive 
revision of the traditional ‘perception regarding the whereabouts of the eastern border of 
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Europe’58. Loukas also defines the formation of three ‘geo-systems’ on the territory of the 
former Soviet Union: ‘The Geo-system of Eastern Europe: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Belarus, Ukraine, Moldavia [sic], Russia, the geo-system of the Caucasus: Georgia, Armenia 
and Azerbaijan’ and ‘the geo-system of Central Asia: Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, 
Tajikistan, Kirgizstan.’59
         Similarly the former communist space, outside of the Soviet Union formed several 
‘geo-systems’ using Loukas’s terminology. Namely these are the Central European 
(Visegrad) countries: Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovak Republic, and, the 
Balkan countries: Albania, Bulgaria, Bosnia, Macedonia, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro, 
Croatia and Slovenia.60 Within these five ‘geo-systems’ some very distinct sub-divisions 
emerged, as some states in one system initiated processes of integration into the Euro-
Atlantic space, while other lacked such a perspective, at least in the observable future. 
1.3 The Balkan Region in the New Geopolitical Order
         Two of these ‘geo-systems’ have always been perceived as turbulent, prone to 
instability, ‘buffer zones’, and namely the Balkans and the Caucasus. In the communist era 
they were at the southernmost border zones of the Soviet geopolitical system, somehow 
neither belonging to Europe, nor to Asia. 
         The new strategic alignments that appeared in the post-cold-war period completely 
changed the strategic position and significance of these regions, although they are still 
considered to be the most vulnerable geo-systems. There are already some indications that the 
Balkans will not be regarded anymore as south-eastern Europe, but as the southern part of 
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Central Europe61, while the Caucasus ‘geo-system’ will be ‘the new’ south-eastern Europe.62
The ‘new’ Eastern Europe will comprise of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus stretching to the 
Ural Mountains in the North and the Caucasus to the South.63 Thus for the first time in 
modern history the geographical boundaries of Europe proper will overlap with the political. 
Ioannis Loukas believes that this will be the predominant paradigm in the twenty-first 
century. 
         Such a development positions the Balkan region at the very heart of Central Europe, 
with a clear perspective for political incorporation in the Euro-Atlantic space. Such a process 
provides the Balkans for the first time with a favorable political framework for development 
in addition to the strategic geography that has always played a vital role for the region, 
regardless of the political status quo.
1.3.1 The Role of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe
         The expressed commitment for accepting the Balkan ‘geo-system’ as part of the Euro-
Atlantic geopolitical system required the economic and military stabilization of the region. 
As an implication of such pursuit for economical reconstruction and secure environment of 
the region lead to the creation of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe (SPSEE) on 10 
June 1999 in Cologne. The Stability Pact was also ‘ the first serious attempt by the 
international community to replace the previous, reactive crisis intervention policy in South 
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Eastern Europe with a comprehensive, long-term conflict prevention strategy.’64 Thus it 
aimed at promoting a ‘secure environment’65, sustainable democratic development and 
economic prosperity. SPSEE also had to foster close cooperation between the countries of the 
region on one hand and between them and the European Union on the other. The latter is a 
key actor in the Stability Pact. It also ‘undertakes to draw South Eastern Europe ‘closer to the 
perspective of full integration ... into its structures’, including eventual full membership.’66
 1.3.2 Transport Infrastructure Needs Assignment (TINA) Initiative, International 
Transport Corridors and the Balkans
         In the framework of this new political and economic cooperation, the role of Transport 
was recognized as of utmost importance for the fulfillment of the common goals of the 
European Union and the transition countries from the new geo-systems. The prospect of the 
accession of the east European countries in the EU gave birth to the vision of the integration of 
Western Europe’s. The Trans European Networks (TEN) were officially agreed upon in 1996, 
to serve as the basic miltimodal road, rail, energy and communication corridors in the EU’s 
infrastructure. At the pan-European Conference of Transport Ministers in Crete (1994) and in 
Helsinki (1997), fifty two countries decided to plan the building of ten more multimodal 
corridors, located in the accession countries, in order to connect the EU’s Trans European 
Networks (TEN) with the infrastructure of Eastern Europe67, as one of the main initiatives 
aiming at supporting the latter’s economy stabilization and facilitating the establishment of the 
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future common European market. The program, connected with the implementation of the 
pan-European transport corridors was called the Transport Infrastructure Needs Assignment 
(TINA) initiative. Representative of EU- countries as well as of the 10 acceding countries 
(plus Cyprus) participated in the initiative.
         At its final stage the TINA Network should comprise of ‘18,683 km of roads, 20,924 km 
of railway lines, 4,052 km of inland waterways, 40 airports, 20 seaports, 58 river ports and 86 
terminals (out of which, 20 are situated in seaports and river ports, and 66 stand alone)’68 and 
should be fully integrated into the already existing Trans European Networks (TEN). The EU 
has set 2015 as an objective for reaching that goal. The estimated budget for the whole project 
by the year 2015 is 90 billion Euro, as for the Balkan part of the project, nearly 11 billion 
Euro.69
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CHAPTER 2
The New Balkan Rivalries in the Transport Sector
Via est Vita (Road is Life)-ancient Roman saying
2.1 States as 'Rational Egoists': Cooperation and Discord 
         Robert Keohane in After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political 
Economy defines that cooperation can be established when 'the policies followed by one 
government are regarded by its partners as facilitating realization of their own objectives, as 
the result of a process of policy coordination.'70 The latter is different from the state of 
harmony, where 'actor interests happen to be in alignment.'71 Cooperation is also 'a situation 
where actor policies would hinder the attainment of the goals of others but through a 
coordination process policies are adjusted so as to obtain cooperation rather than discord if 
polices were not adjusted -- behavior patterns are altered via coordination to achieve 
cooperation.'72 Keohane perceives the mutual interest of states as given, but accounts for the 
fact that even when mutual interests exist, cooperation very often is not achieved. Keohane 
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writes for states as 'rational egoists' and also that international relations are interplay of 
'dependence and conflict, of partnership and competition.' 73
         However, there are certain arrangements that facilitate cooperation and namely 
international regimes and institutions. The latter, according to Keohane are 'recognized 
patterns of practice around which expectations converge -- and these practices affect state 
behavior allowing for cooperation', while international regimes are 'arrangements for policy 
coordination created by the fact of interdependence – they are made up of rules, norms, 
principles, and decision-making procedures.'74
2.1.1 Controversies between the Actual Situation of Discord in the Balkans and the 
Favorable Cooperation-Facilitating International Regimes
         Relating theory to the Balkan context, we can clearly rule out the state of harmony in 
interstate relations. However in the new geopolitical post-Cold War order the Balkans are 
included in the Euro-Atlantic system, and thus strongly influenced by integration and 
globalization processes. In such a political and economical framework, the present 
international regimes provide scope for intensive policy coordination and cooperation among 
Balkan states, as a consequence of the growing interdependence. These countries' institutions 
have to perform 'patterns of practice' consistent with the new political and economical order.    
         In International Relation’s theory on cooperation and discord, realists  ‘assume that 
states are obsessed with relative gains’ and ‘any potential exchange between states must 
exactly preserve the pre-existing balance of power’.75 On the other hand liberal 
institutionalists, assume that states leaders are primarily motivated by absolute gains’ and that 
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‘state leaders will accept any agreement which makes the state better off.’76 Therefore, two of 
the main Keohane's criteria facilitating cooperation mentioned above -international regimes 
and institutions create a favorable framework for absolute gains- thinking and coordination 
never experienced before on the Balkans. Furthermore the liberal paradigm which is 
embedded in globalization and in particular EU integration also presupposes that integration-
favoring political elites should also be motivated by absolute gains thinking, rather than 
solely relying on relative gains. 
         Regional blocs undermine the classical realist vision of states as constitutive parts of the 
international system .77 In regional blocs, such as the EU there is already ‘higher authority 
that can constrain or channel the behavior of states’78 and facilitate cooperation as states no 
longer operate in chaos. The old realist argument justifying the logic of relative gains that 
‘security and well-being ultimately rest on their ability to mobilize [states’] own resources 
against external threat’79 is no longer adequate. Regional blocs promote cooperation and 
advance the logic of absolute gains.
         Although it is a fact that even in the most Euro-committed countries, politicians are 
concerned both with absolute and relative gains, in situations when ‘the policies followed by 
one government are regarded by its partners as facilitating realization of their own objectives, 
as the result of a process of policy coordination’80, cooperation is usually achieved. 
Furthermore ‘neo-realists explain that all states must be concerned with the absolute and 
relative gains that result from the international agreements and cooperative efforts’ and neo-
liberal institutionalists are ‘less concerned about relative gains and consider that all will 
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benefit from absolute gains.’81 However both consider the importance of absolute gains for 
cooperation to occur.
         This is not the case in the Balkans. Although Balkan political elites might be expected 
to also focus on absolute gains at least in situations which will most certainly make their 
countries better off, they still prefer to think predominantly in relative terms. 
According to realists, states worry that today’s friend may be tomorrow’s enemy in 
war, and fear that achievements of joint gains that advantage a friend in the present 
might produce a more dangerous potential foe in the future. As a result states must give 
serious attention to the gains of partners.82
Despite the encouraging environment and the fact that they very often share mutual interests, 
Balkan countries fail to coordinate their policies in the big Pan-European transport and 
infrastructure projects, which are perceived as the backbone of the EU's initiative for 
economic and political recovery of Eastern Europe, and the Balkans in particular. Where do 
the obstacles come from?
2.2 States as ‘Irrational Egoists’: Geography as the ultimate weapon on the 
Balkans
         Jeanne Kirk Laux writes that the post-communist world promises to fulfill two post-
World War II dreams -- the European dream of building a regional security order based on 
common social and economic interests; and the American dream of extending market 
economics and democratic institutions into a worldwide liberal order.’83 In the light of the new 
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geopolitical system, in the Balkans international regimes and institutions facilitate the  ‘secure 
environment’, sustainable democratic development and promote economic prosperity, all of 
which are not only European or American ‘dreams’, but highly-required prerequisites in order 
for the ‘return to Europe’ to take place. 84  
         In the last years we are witnessing the gradual fulfillment of all three factors. Namely 
since the end of the Yugoslav wars, there is a relatively secure conflict-free environment (with 
the possible exceptions of the Macedonian-Albanian and Kosovo conflicts). The sustainable 
democratic development is recognized by the classification of most Balkan countries as liberal 
democracies with one of the highest values for political and human freedoms in the world. 
Concerning the third requirement, needed for a successful implementation of the infrastructure 
projects, namely economic development, the region’s countries are still the countries with one 
of the lowest GDP per capita in Europe. However the growth rates are among the highest in 
the continent. (6 percent for Bulgaria in 2000, 5,3 percent for Romania in 2001, etc.), while 
the rate for Western economies is within the range of 1,5 to 2,0 percent. Furthermore the 
World Bank predicts for the period 2003-2005 steady 4.8% and 4.6% average GDP growth for 
Romania and Bulgaria respectively.85
         Greater part of ‘the return to Europe’ project, which by virtue incorporates the East 
European countries’ inclusion in the regimes of Western regional governance and security, 
‘acceptance into the established institutions of market economics’86, is the completion of the 
pan-European infrastructure projects crossing the region. Although all the required criteria, 
discussed thoroughly above, for the successful completion of the infrastructure projects are 
met, these projects remain in their infancy stage. 
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         Considering the very favorable geographic location, the Balkan lands are perceived as 
the key to three continents- Europe, Asia, Africa and also the Middle East. They are also 
located on the boundary of three civilization zones according to Samuel Huntington's  
civilization paradigm. This geopolitical location has influenced the Balkan countries' history 
and determined the great geopolitical stake concentrated on this relatively small territory. 
Thus it comes as no surprise that six of the ten multimodal: transport, oil, gas and 
telecommunication corridors, planned at the Helsinki summit in 1997, pass through the 
Balkans and namely Corridors IV, V, VII, VIII, IX, X (see fig.1 and Appendix 1).
FIGURE 1. PAN-EUROPEAN TRANSPORT CORRIDORS ON THE BALKANS
Map courtesy of  balcanica.org
         It is a fact that the relatively small Balkan Peninsula is the land of eleven countries87
with a complicated economical and historical development, which are in a process of 
transition to a market economy and on the way of full integration into the Euro-Atlantic 
institutions. In such a cooperation-facilitating international framework at the turn of the 
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century, the prevailing Balkan lack of cooperation, in the transport and energy sector is a 
phenomenon worthy for exploration.
        In the Balkans, Keohane’s rational egoist state is clashing with the irrational homo 
Balkanicus-egoist State. Very often external actors perceive such irrationality as rooted in 
historical prejudices, mutual mistrust and vivid stereotypes. However the argument in this 
research is completely different. Irrationality is regarded, not as a consequence of ‘ancient 
hatreds’ and genetic predisposition, but in relation to the current political and economical 
context. It is truly irrational not to cooperate today with so many obvious benefits arising 
from eventual cooperation. Is there something particular that makes Balkan political elites so 
stubborn and suspicious to each other in regards with the implementation of the big pan-
European infrastructure projects? 
         Probably the main reason for such state of affairs is the very large geopolitical stake 
involved in the transport and energy-infrastructure routes. Balkan countries set great hopes in 
the construction of large-scale pan-European infrastructure projects, ‘believed to help them 
get out of their state of crisis as it was the case in the US and Germany in the 1930's’ 
following the Great Depression.88
         Another argument explains the political obstruction with geopolitical interests of 
external actors. Misha Glenny writes: ‘Most of the ethnic and political conflict in the Balkans 
has its roots not in atavistic instincts and tribal sentiments of intolerance for otherness, but 
rather in games played by cynical great powers.’89
         Another tempting answer would be to point out the complicated historical legacy, which 
still influences Balkan governments’ decisions in all aspects of foreign policy, and 
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particularly in such project of vital geopolitical significance as the pan-European transport 
infrastructure corridors network. Although such argument might really be plausible to a 
certain extent, it most certainly introduces some degree of political danger. Some writers like 
Robert Kaplan created an image for the Balkans as ‘a place riven by such innate, historical 
and profound ethnic and religious hatreds, that a brutal war and ethnic cleansing seem almost 
inevitable.’90 Kaplan’ Balkan Ghosts are believed to have ‘contributed to false perceptions 
about [external actor’s] ...ability to influence events in the Balkans’ and further strengthening 
the Western stereotypes about the region’s incapability to deal with modernity.91Kaplan’s 
book argues that even in the case of Western intervention, the ‘risk for new waves of angry 
battles and appalling massacres will always be very high,’ 92 because of the intrinsic  ‘ancient 
hatreds’ in the region.
         Maria Todorova’s Imagining the Balkans challenges Kaplan’s theories and most of the 
Western stereotype ‘balkanisms’. She also writes that ‘as in the case of the Orient, the 
Balkans have served as a repository of negative characteristics against which a positive and 
self-congratulatory image of the 'European' and the 'West' has been constructed.’93Reflecting 
on authors like Todorova, Gergana Dimitrova summarizes their arguments:
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Recent critical scholarship demonstrates that hegemonic Western representations of the 
Balkans have attached to the region an image of danger, instability, violence, eternal 
conflict and civilizational ambiguity. These representations affect not only the region's 
international image. They intervene in the construction of Balkan identity and 
continuously slip into political conduct. The Balkan countries have to a large extent 
internalized the West's image of themselves, and have come to consider 'Balkan' as 
dangerous, impure and undesirable.94
          Although the historical legacy argument should not be overemphasized, it also should 
not be completely disregarded.  Also an important distinction should be made-Balkan nations 
and political elites should not be regarded in Kaplan’s terms as being eternally prone to 
conflicts, because of some kind of ‘Balkan history ghosts’ or genetic predisposition. Instead 
the conflicts should be regarded in their historical and political context. The historical legacy 
argument should be explored only in relation to the conflict’s contemporary framework. 
What is most interesting for this research is why in the present historical and political context, 
which is strongly facilitating cooperation, Balkan elites still cannot find their common ways, 
which is evidenced by the rivalries upon the routes of the major energy and transport projects 
to be build. 
         The research explores some present policy aspects, which support the finding that 
historical legacy might still have some influence on Balkan elites, by exploring the region’s 
historical doctrines, present transport and energy strategies. However it also takes into 
account the difficulties from the fact that such documents are usually not officially published, 
or published in very limited quantities. Operationalization of such a variable as historical 
legacy is also a significant challenge.
         However it is a fact that most of the region’s countries have decades, even centuries-old 
national doctrines and strategies for the development of their nations. These doctrines 
(strategies, programs) although periodically revised are still irrelevant to the today’s 
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processes of globalization, multilateralism and integration. They incorporate many elements, 
consistent with Blouet’s geopolitical thinking. The Balkan political elite’s foreign policy 
today is to a large extent based on national programs, strategies or doctrines for the 
development of the respective nation. Such doctrines encompass different spheres of social 
life, such as economical, political, cultural, prescribing norms of political behavior, 
inconsistent with the globalization and integration concept and the Euro-Atlantic values, to 
which all Balkan elites are somehow hypocritically adhering. Present national strategies have 
their roots in the national doctrines of the Balkan countries, adopted shortly after their 
liberation in mid or late XIX century. 
         Some analysts wrote that behind the creation of such programs in the nineteenth 
century, lay ‘their intense nationalism and the desire for territorial aggrandizement, under the 
pretext of including all co-nationals into their respective nation state’95 The nationalist 
dreams of ‘Greater Bulgaria,’ ‘Greater Serbia’, ‘Greater Romania’ and ‘Greater Greece’, for 
example, strongly influenced these programs at the time of their adoption.
         The original Greek Megali idea  (Great Idea) was first formulated in 1796 by Rigas 
Ferreros. According to Ferreros ‘Istanbul, which was conquered by Fatih the Conquerer [sic] 
in 1453, will be taken back,...[as well as] Crete, Rodhos, Cyprus, Anatolia ... Greeks will go 
up to Egypt as Alexander the Great had done it before and a Hellene Empire called Byzantum 
will be established.’96 Thus the Greeks’ dream was reviving the Bysantium Empire in the 
form of a modern Greek nation-state.97 After its independence from the Ottoman Empire 
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Greek state had closely followed this program, as it succeeded in incorporating Crete, 
Rodhos, 12 Islands and the other Agean [sic] Islands into the modern state. In 1919 Greece 
managed to take control on Izmir and parts of Anatolia in Turkey, but was defeated and three 
years later had to withdraw.
         Bulgaria’s national idea, adopted in 1878 was – borders according to the Treaty of San 
Stefano (3 March 1878- a present Bulgarian national holiday). Thus the Bulgarian state 
would be complete only if encompassing the three territories inhabited by the Bulgarian 
ethos, as the state considered them – Moesia, Thrace and Macedonia.98 Since the country’s 
liberation, Bulgarian political elites had involved the country in five wars to accomplish their 
idee fixe, which had very negative consequences for its further development.
         Serbian national doctrine was called Nachertanie (Strategy) and was formulated by Ilia 
Garashanin in 1844. Its main theses were the creation of a Serbian state, overlapping with the 
boundaries of the medieval empire of King Stefan Dushan. Such a state had to include all 
territories adjacent to Serbia-Bulgaria, Macedonia, Albania, Montenegro, Bosnia, Croatia and 
Hungary. For every territory, mentioned above a special plan is developed. Until 1929 the 
Serbian program Nachertanie has been a document of highest secrecy. Since 1844 until the 
split of Yugoslavia in 1991, ‘closely following its [Nachertanie] principles the political elites 
of Serbia managed to transform 4 million newly-liberated Serbia into a 25 million 
Yugoslavia.’99
         As Hristo Genchev writes Balkan infrastructure completion should follow a strategy, 
which is above any national strategy with simple and clear criteria: most shortest and 
profitable routes, situated according to where the natural geographical morphology of the 
Balkans is most facilitating to such projects. These should be linkages among industrial and 
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demographic centers, long established by geographical and historical factors, such as 
crossroads, water resources, favorable climate, rich hinterland, labor force. ‘Only similar 
strategy could provide for the best investment of the limited local and external funds for these 
projects.’100 What happens in fact?
         Present national doctrines, such as the Greek ‘Unity and Lobbying of the Hellenes 
around the World’ or the Bulgarian National Doctrine: National Strategic Programs101 are 
most certainly very different from their discredited predecessors. However in the present 
programs for the development of the respective nation still could be traced elements from 
their compromised original documents. The neighbors are still perceived as ultimate rivals, 
but not as partners. Even if they are perceived as partners, the idea for domination could still 
be sensed in the concept of own exclusiveness or missionary role in relation to other Balkan 
countries. Dino Siotis, commenting on the new geopolitics of Greece writes:
            Naturally Greece is more advanced than the rest of the Balkan countries. All of 
these Balkan states came out of restrictive regimes, lacking democratic governments, 
and unable to express themselves freely. As such, they can not be compared with 
Greece, a country that has taken gigantic strides toward democracy, economic and 
cultural development and, above all, human rights. The New Balkan countries 
considered, and continue to consider, Greece as the state which offers them inspiration, 
showing them the way toward Europe and leading them to a democratic
system...Greece may be considered a small country in comparison with other, more 
powerful European countries, but in the Balkans it is considered a "superpower", a 
power which has taken on the role of defending human freedom and an agent of 
stability and security in the area.102
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         Another reason for the competition along the routes of the energy and transport 
corridors is the great geopolitical significance infrastructure projects might have for the 
economic recovery of the region. Most of the Balkan countries perceive their transitory 
location between three continents as an asset of utmost importance. Therefore Balkan 
political elites believe that the large-scale pan-European infrastructure projects will help them 
‘get out of their state of crisis, as it was the case in the US and Germany in the 1930's after 
the great crisis in 1929-1931’.103 If a certain country has geographical advantage in relation 
with a planned energy or transport project route, most neighboring country conceive the 
former’s profits as potential losses for them, which is a main reason for the intensive rivalries 
and creation of alternative projects. The latter aim at diverting a planned route to other 
country’s advantage, regardless of the geographical, economical and technical merits the 
original project might have had.
         The immense infrastructure projects have been adopted by the EU to help the economic, 
political and cultural integration of the post-communist space into the Euro-Atlantic system 
of shared values. However instead of serving an integrative function, the transport and energy 
corridors became an object of fierce rivalry among Balkan political elites. Despite the widely, 
but hypocritically proclaimed dedication to the values of integrating and globalizing Europe 
in their Balkan policy, these political elites are de facto still employing the Blouet’s 
geopolitical planning, which is inconsistent with the philosophy of the present globalizing 
world and their aspiration for EU accession. The above explored factors such as economic 
and geopolitical significance, historical legacy and external actors’ influence might have 
contributed to the present state of conflicting policies between the Balkan countries in regards 
to the pan European transport corridors, oil and gas pipelines and in the energy sector. As a 
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consequence of such geopolitical planning (embedded in national programs, strategies, 
doctrines) in intra-Balkan relations, which is embedded in the above mentioned geopolitical 
thinking of Balkan political elites the democratization and economic recovery of these 
societies is significantly hindered.
         The clash of the interests in the transport sector and the consequences for the 
development of the respective Balkan societies will be thoroughly explored below with a 
number of different cases. Despite all favorable factors, discussed above, which should 
enhance cooperation, such as ‘internationalization of foreign policy’104 regimes, the EU-
NATO integration, Stability Pact programs, TINA initiatives, Balkan political elites very 
often encounter a situation of discord, failing to coordinate their policies in building the pan-
European transport infrastructure projects. They fail to coordinate, despite the obvious mutual 
interests that exist and the great gains, discussed above (secure environment, benefits of 
integrated market economies, etc.)  they would get if cooperate.
2.2.1 Conflicts along the route of the Great Silk Road: Via Egnatia vs. Transport 
Corridor VIII (‘Via Para Egnatia’)
         In antiquity the Great Silk Road has been the shortest route between Europe and the Far 
East. It stretched for nearly 7000 km, starting from the northwestern provinces of China and 
finishing at the East Mediterranean. The Great Silk Road was in fact a trade route between 
Rome and China with mainly silk departing westward and wool, silver gold on the way 
back.105 However after the fall of the Roman Empire and the Great Geographical Discoveries 
era in the later centuries, the significance of this route diminished and it was neglected for the 
centuries to come. During the communist era the ancient Silk Road has been further 
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completely blocked and such situation deformed the natural economical and cultural flows 
along this route.
         The continent-scale project TRACECA (Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia) is 
considered to be the modern ‘Eurasian renaissance of the [Great] Silk Road.’106 It was 
adopted on the Third Pan-European Transport Conference, held in Helsinki, 1997 (although 
the first initiatives go back as 1993), as an implication of the new geopolitical understanding 
of Europe. Its main objective was to provide for new transport routes between Europe and 
Asia, as well as to integrate the Caucasus and Central Asian countries to the transport 
infrastructure of the EU. It should also promote political and economical sustainability as 
well as enhance cooperation between the countries along the corridor. 
         However the TRACECA corridor does not completely overlap with the ancient Silky 
Road, as it is shifted southward to circumvent the turbulent region of the Near and the Middle 
East (Iran, Syria, Saudi Arabia, etc). The slightly altered route would create a thousand km-
long diagonal of Euro-Atlantic-values-committed countries, passing in-between the ‘risk 
region’ to the south and Russia to the north.
         On the financial part, the EU and the initiative for technical assistance to the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS) helped to attract IFIs, such as the World 
Bank (WB), the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the Islamic 
Development Bank (IDB), the Asian Development Bank (ADB) have made commitments to 
provide more than 1.7 billion Euro for the project.107 TRACECA is planned to be fully 
operational by 2020. 
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         At the conference in Helsinki, ‘It had been recognized that one of the weaknesses of the 
TRACECA route, in the context of the EU Tacis program, was the lack of linkage between 
the western end and the European market’108 Therefore it was decided that the TRACECA 
corridor would be integrated to the pan-European Trans-European Networks (TENs) by a link 
on ‘corridors IV and VIII, via the port of Varna’ on the west Black Sea coast. Therefore as 
Eric Cotte analyzed ‘the planned development projects on the European continent scheduled 
for the next 20 years depend on the building of corridors crossing the Balkans.’109
Furthermore the whole feasibility of the connection between Europe and Asia (TEN and 
TRACECA) on the revived Silk Road depends on the link through the Balkans and namely: 
port of Poti [Georgia] in the Caucasus-port of Varna [Bulgaria] on the Balkans, how it was 
initially adopted.   
         The part of the Great Silk Road that is passing through the Balkans is the so-called 
Corridor VIII, also adopted at the Helsinki, 1997 conference. The route of pan-European 
multimodal Corridor VIII from Caucasus -Poti (Georgia) to the Italian port of Brindisi is 
planned to start in the Black Sea port of Varna, Burgas, Dimitrovgrad and Sofia on Bulgarian 
territory, then pass through Skopje and Bitola in Macedonia and reach the Adriatic cost at 
Durrës in Albania. (See fig.2 below [red color])
         Furthermore the corridor East-West (corridor VIII) was not only supported by the EU in 
the Crete (1993) conference but also by the US-government. In New York (1995) four 
Balkan Presidents (Albania, Macedonia, Bulgaria and Turkey) in the presence of President 
Clinton announced the South Balkan Development Initiative (SBDI). ‘The SBDI is designed 
to help Albania, Bulgaria and FYR Macedonia further develop and integrate their 
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transportation infrastructure along the east-west corridor that connects them.’110 This project 
received the strong support by Washington and later was reconfirmed by the EU on the 
Helsinki conference as Corridor VIII was proclaimed the shortest and most efficient trade 
route between Europe and Asia, which is evidenced by the economical indicators below;
The length of Corridor N8, defined on the basis of the now functioning road, is 995 km 
The mutual trade of countries within the Balkan segment is USD 13 420 million for 
1997, and of those along the continuation of the Corridor towards Central Asia - USD 
34 213 million, or totally along the whole length of the Corridor - USD 47 633 million. 
For most of the countries prognoses and trends indicate a GNP increase - in Bulgaria by 
3% yearly, in Albania - 5%, Macedonia - 1-1,5%, Armenia - 5%, Azerbajan - 5-6%, 
Georgia - 10%, Kazakhstan - 2%, Kirghizstan - 6%, Tadjikistan - 3-5%, Turkmenistan -
2%, Uzbekistan - 2%. The expected ratio between local and transit traffic, as revealed 
by the macroeconomic indexes, is 1:3 - 1:5 in favor of the transit one. It is evident that 
the parameters and qualities of the already built and functioning transport infrastructure 
in the region, as compared to those of other transport routes from East to West, lag 
behind in creating competitive conditions for attracting traffic.111
         However the immense geopolitical stake that concentrates in such a link, bridging two 
continents provoked fierce 
competition among Balkan 
countries to divert its route, 
through their territory, despite the 
decisions of the 1997 Helsinki 
conference. 
                                                
110
US Trade and Development Agency, ‘TDA Awards $4.3 Million in Transportation Grants In The South 
Balkans’, available at http://www.tda.gov/trade/press/dec9_98.html; Internet; accessed June, 2003.
111
Serguey Roussev, ‘Environment Management along the Road-Bed of Trans-European Corridor N8 in the 
Section between Sofia and Skopje’, in Balkans: Politics, Economy, Security [journal on-line] 2, no. 2 
(2000);available from http://www.balcanica.org/balkanreview/current/a3.html , accessed May, 2003
41
FIGURE 2. PAN-EUROPEAN CORRIDOR N8 VS. GREEK PROJECT VIA EGNATIA
         For example Greece, started investing 1 trillion GDR (3.4 billion Euro) in a gigantic 
project called Via Egnatia (marked with dark blue on fig.2), passing from Istanbul, through 
Greek Provinces of Thrace and Macedonia and finishing on the Ionic Sea and from there 
continuing to Italy by ferry-connections suspiciously soon after the initiative for the Corridor 
VIII, which circumvented Greece was announced in the Second Transport Conference in 
Crete (1994). 
         The ancient Roman road Via Egnatia was one of the major transport, trade and military-
purpose arteries, connecting the two capitals of the Empire- Rome and Konstantinopolis112, 
stretching for 754 Roman miles (1117km) from the Adriatic port of Dyrrachium (near 
present-day Durrës, Albania) to the capital- Konstantinopolis. It was constructed in 130 BC 
and named after Proconsul Gaius Ignatius, who ordered its construction.113
         The modern Greek project, closely following the ancient route of Via Egnatia 
encompasses a motorway- 680 km -long, 24.5 m wide, '1650 bridges, with a combined length 
of 40 km, 76 tunnels, with a combined length of 49,5 km, 50 interchanges with the existing 
road network, 43 river crossings and 11 railway crossings.'114 Via Egnatia is often referred as 
'project on a scale never before contemplated in Greece'115 and one of the 'largest road 
construction projects in Europe.'116
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         Greek authorities often consider transport- Corridor VIII, as Paraegnatia, which means 
‘opposite of Via Egnatia’. Furthermore Axel Stiris Wallden in the volume ‘Greece and the 
New Balkans: Challenges and Opportunities’ writes that Corridor VIII (red in fig.2) and Via 
Egnatia (blue in fig.2) are mutually exclusive and that the Greek project is much more 
feasible.117 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Greece declares that ‘Via Egnatia is perhaps 
the most vital road project for the country ... to link western and southern Europe with the 
East.’118 It is clear that for Greece the ancient Silky Road should be diverted from Corridor 
VIII, adopted in Helsinki, 1997 to Via Egnatia. Furthermore some Balkan analysts suspected 
that Greece was sabotaging Corridor VIII, using its privilege position as the only EU-member 
in the region. Arben Kola for example writes:
          However, while the Albanians were most ardent supporters of the Corridor, until 
recently the Greeks have been its greatest opponents. Athens was afraid that the 
construction of this Corridor might reduce the importance of the port of Thessaloniki. 
Being a member of the European Union, which will be the main investor in the Project, 
Greece tried hard to postpone its realization. 119
    
         Upon its completion, Via Egnatia would be the first major infrastructure project in 
Greece along the East-West direction. For decades the country’s transport infrastructure has 
been developed in the North-South direction from Athens to Thessaloniki –Belgrade and 
Western Europe. (Corridor X) As an implication of Greece’s dedication to the North-South 
direction on the Transport Conference in Helsinki (1997) Greece’s delegation managed to 
carry its point of building a new Corridor X Salzburg (Austria), Ljubljana, Zagreb, Belgrade, 
Nis, Skopje and Thessalonica (Greece). On the same conference Romania pushed for corridor 
IV to divert to Constanta, as an alternative to the already-planned route through Vidin-Calafat 
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to Thessaloniki. These three developments and namely, Greece’s project Via Egnatia 
(opposed to Corridor VIII, see fig.2), Corridor X as an alternative to the southern direction of 
Corridor IV (see fig.5) and the alternative Romanian Corridor IVa to Constanta (see fig. 1 
and 2), all of which ardently supported by Greece suspiciously coincide with one Greek 
geopolitical program, formulated thirty 
years ago from the Athens Center of 
Ekistics. The project Ecumenopolis 
2080120(see fig.3a) defines, which 
Balkan territories should be subject of 
modernizing, industrializing and 
urbanizing (marked with black clusters 
of dots) with three level-scale of 
investment intensity121. According to the Greek hypothesis from 1969, in the time horizon of 
2080[!] the transport directions East-West and North-South should pass through Greece.  
According to this strategy the role of the diagonal projection, the ancient Via Militaris from 
Istanbul, through Belgrade to Vienna (marked with red diagonal line on fig.3a) that has 
always been attracting the large amounts of the trade flows between Asia and Europe, even in 
the Cold War era, should be weakened through the building of the Belgrade-Thessaloniki 
route, Via Egnatia and the Constanta-Budapest road. (black clusters on fig.3a) In the 1997-
article ‘Geography-Arbiter in the Rivalry, Called Balkan Cooperation’, Hristo Genchev 
writes:
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I always believed that similar appropriations of geography 
could only exist only under exclusive circumstances, such as 
the Cold War. The idea that a single Balkan country-Bulgaria-
could be intentionally isolated, seemed to me horrific, but the 
geopolitical project Via Egnatia, which was planned as a 
component of the Balkan range of Ecumenopolis 2080 ...began 
to be realized precisely in the years after 1989122
     
FIGURES 3A AND 3B. ECUMENOPOLIS 2080-GREEK PROGRAM FOR DEVELOPMENT, URBANIZING AND 
MODERNIZING
         Although these fears of Bulgarian scientific and political circles might be somehow 
exaggerated, it is a fact that four decades after Ecumenopolis 2080 was created, the Athens 
Center of Ekistics in the article of Professor John G. Papaioannoupublished an updated map 
of Ecumenopolis. 123 The new time horizon was the year 2100. From the segment of the map, 
taken from the article (fig.3b) could be seen that the project Ecumenopolis has not changed 
much even after the global geopolitical transformations after the Cold War and the adoption 
of Pan-European Transport Corridors. The areas that have to be developed on the Balkans are 
again Via Egnatia, Thessaloniki -Belgrade and Constanta-Budapest routes, circumventing the 
Great diagonal Istanbul-Belgrade-Budapest. (the latter indicated with red line in fig. 3a, 
added by me, to indicate where the black clusters are missing. This is an implication of the 
idea of the Greek strategy Ecumenopolis 2100 that the Great diagonal should not be a subject 
of modernizing, industrializing and urbanizing). Even if these accusation of narrow single-
state-interest geopolitical planning might be somehow overstated, it is suspicious that modern 
Greek political elites at present support exactly those projects, described in the Ecumenopolis 
2080 and Ecumenopolis 2100.
         Bulgaria in the ‘opposite camp’ is engaged in developing its own paramount project,
and namely ‘The gigantic infrastructure project...Corridor N8, [which] will be finished by 
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2020’ according to the prognosis of the American Trade and Economic Development 
Agency. Bulgaria perceived the intensification of the construction works of the Greek Via 
Egnatia project as an impetus to further increase the speed of the works on its part of Corridor 
VIII.124
         After Bulgarian diplomatic efforts on Sep, 9th 2002 Memorandum for the Completion of 
Corridor VIII was signed in Bari, Italy, where Bulgaria has again declared that Corridor VIII 
is a major project of paramount importance for its economy. Although the country insists that 
it is lacking funds for construction of the pan-European corridors it constantly secures funds 
from the state budget and international donors, such as EIB to exclusively invest in the route 
Sofia-Burgas, which is part of Corridor VIII. The estimated budget for the project is about 2.2 
billion dollars and the section through Bulgarian territory requires 1.2 billion BGN (700 
million dollars). On March 16, 2003 Regional Development Minister Valentin Tserovski 
opened the construction of the new section of the Thrakia motorway  [Bulgarian name for the 
part of Corridor VIII, crossing the country] between Orizovo and Stara Zagora. ‘The project 
is worth about EUR 54 M, eighty percent of which are provided by the European Investment 
Bank and the rest of the money will come from the state budget. About 3000 workers [!] will 
be employed in the construction, which is expected to finish in 30 months.’125
         While Bulgaria and Greece competed for the faster completion of ‘their’projects, 
Corridor VII and Via Egnatia respectively, in order to attract the traffic along the future 
Europe-Asia corridor, Romania proposed its own territory as the fastest and most efficient 
route along the Road of the Silk In the common strategy of the Romanian Transport Ministry 
and the National Railway Company the road from Constanta to Budapest (Corridor IVa) 
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(marked with yellow on fig.2) has the greatest priority over all other infrastructure projects, 
especially over the other branch of corridor IV. Romanian government neglects the latter 
route, because upon completion it would be the fastest linkage to the ‘rivalry projects’ of 
Corridor VII and Via Egnatia. Furthermore the strategy clearly indicates that Romania, 
perceives ‘their’ variant as the place for the link from Europe to Asia. According to the 
Romanian transport development strategy, published on the site of the Romanian State 
Railways-CFR,
Two branches of the 4 Corridor cross Romania from West to East - the northern branch 
(Curtici, Arad, Coslariu, Brasov, Bucharest, Constanta) and from South to West - the 
southern branch (Curtici, Arad, Timisoara, Craiova, Calafat)...
 the northern branch of the 4th Corridor has priority on the route Curtici, Arad, Alba 
Iulia, Brasov, Bucharest, Constanta, that insures the railway transit link on Romanian 
territory for the Central and Western Europe with the Southeast Europe and the Middle 
Orient relation. 126
         Despite their advanced EU-accession stage (for Bulgaria and Romania) and its member 
status (for Greece), Balkan political elites continue to perceive their neighbor as an opponent, 
as a ‘subject’ of fierce rivalry. The infrastructure projects that are common European 
initiative are being modified in order to diminish the significance and the profit of the 
neighbor and increase its own, which most definitely was not the idea behind their adoption. 
Alternative projects are being proposed, regardless of economic efficiency, technical 
parameters and geography. Geography is used in Haushofer’s Geopolitik-way, as Balkan 
political elites still have ‘space-bound’ mentality. It is simply irrational to be ‘space-bound’ 
in boundless Europe. Irrational: both economically and politically.
                                                                                                                                                       
126
CFR-Romanian State Railway Company, Modernising the Railway Network on the Fourth Pane[sic]-
European Corridor, available at http://www.cfr.ro/JF/engleza/2000_9/coridor.htm; Internet; accessed May, 
2003
47
2.2.2 Bridges without Shores: The Geopolitical Battle over the Place of the Second 
Danube Bridge on the Route of Corridor IV 
... Dim politicians might do exist in this world, but definitely not dim drivers-Ognyan 
Minchev
         Another implication of the Balkan policy of obstruction is the decade-long negotiation 
process between the governments of Bulgaria and Romania for the place of a second Danube 
bridge to be constructed between the two countries. A peculiar fact is that in the 470 km-long 
common Bulgarian-Romanian border along the river Danube, there is only one bridge in 
operation, connecting the two countries, and namely the Ruse-Giurgiu Bridge in the east part 
of the border (68 km away from Bucharest). (see fig.4) 
FIGURE 4. BULGARIAN AND ROMANIAN GEOPOLITICAL CLASHES OVER THE SECOND DANUBE BRIDGE PROJECT
         For comparison only in Budapest alone with Lágymányos Bridge completed recently, 
there are nine permanent bridges spanning between the two shores of the river127. 
Furthermore ‘along the total [European], Danube navigable length, 104 bridges are built at an 
48
average distance of 21.38 kilometers. The distance between the last bridge, Moldova - Veke 
Bridge, and the Danube Bridge at Ruse is 556.42 km’128, which is 40 times longer than the 
average density in the upper part of the river. 
          The bridge at Ruse, or ‘The Bridge of Friendship’, as it was called, was opened back in 
1954 and served mainly the trade relations of the Balkan countries and the USSR. The bridge 
was a significant element of the infrastructure, comprising of road, rail, gas and oil 
connections, serving the Northeastern direction (from Balkans to USSR) of trade flows, 
cultural and military interaction.
          The new geopolitical order strongly diminished the importance of the Balkan 
countries’ trade connections with Russia, as most of them reoriented their import-export 
policies towards the EU-markets. Thus the corridor through Ruse gave way to the route along 
the ancient Via Militaris from Istanbul through Sofia to Belgrade and Western Europe 
(marked with blue on fig.4) in terms of geopolitical significance, because it is the shortest 
land connection between the Near East, Middle East and Europe. The new international 
regimes and geopolitical order positioned the European Union as the new major trade partner 
for the Balkan economies, thus the Via Militaris was perceived as the backbone along which 
the ‘return to Europe’ project would concentrate. 
         However the war conflict in former Yugoslavia, which started on June 27, 1991 when 
the Yugoslav People's Army marched into Slovenia, and the subsequent wars with Croatia, 
Bosnia and Kosovo in the next decade, had a strong impact on the transport system in the 
Balkans. The wars  ‘virtually made unusable the shortest route from Western Europe to the 
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Balkans and Asia’129, and namely the Via Militaris.  Such a state of affairs provoked a 
nervous search for an ‘alternative route to the EU that circumvents Serbian territory’130, as 
the losses that the Balkan economies suffered from the embargo on Yugoslavia and the 
blocked routes amounted billions of dollars. Around 1996, only for Bulgaria the figure was 
estimated at 4 bln dollar- losses.131
          The initial idea for construction of a second Danube bridge dates back to 1993. 
However negotiations started, as late as in 1995, when Bulgaria and Romania decided to 
build an alternative route to Western Europe: a ‘strategic bridge that could link the countries 
of Southeast Europe afflicted by the crisis with the European transport system.’132 EU 
announced that it would support the project with a 200 million ECU credit on very favorable 
terms.133 That was perceived as the ‘the only real compensation for the damages the two 
countries suffered from the embargo against Yugoslavia’.134 However the location of the new 
bridge turned out to be a highly –contested issue, with Romania staunchly refusing to 
consider any variant to the west of the port of Nikopol. (red line on fig.4-Bulgarian projects 
of interest to the west of the line, Romanian-to the east), while Bulgaria supporting a 
connection at the very west part of the border at Vidin-Calafat or Lom-Rast. In particular, the 
Romanian side proposed three variants on the Bucharest meeting between Bulgarian prime 
minister Jan Videnov and Romanian president Ion Iliescu, held in 1996 and namely: a link at 
Nikopol - Turnu Magurele, new bridge at Ruse, or Silistra to the east. (see fig.4) Such 
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variants were economically inefficient as they would increase significantly the total length of 
the road and also they would overlap with the already-built bridge at Ruse, serving mainly the 
connection to Northern Europe and the CIS countries, but completely inadequate as a 
connection serving the ties with Western Europe. For example the Budapest - Szeged - Arad -
Pitesti - Bucharest - Ruse  - Sofia - Thessaloniki is 1553 km long, while the road through 
Vidin –Calafat would be just 1289 km, only 238 km longer than the classical route from 
Istanbul through Belgrade to Budapest.135 (1051km.)
           In 1994 the British independent consultancy company Sir Alexander Gibb was financed 
by the PHARE program to research ‘the second bridge necessity and to find ‘its most 
appropriate place, through estimating the traffic’136 The survey concluded that the most 
appropriate place for the bridge is at the western part of the river at Lom-Rast (which is very 
near to Vidin-Calafat), which is the shortest and potentially economically most profitable 
variant. However official Bucharest denied these results and continued to obstruct the 
implementation of the project. From the facts stated above it is visible, that the Romanian 
side declared its willingness to participate in a construction of an alternative bridge, while at 
the same time obstructing it as much as possible, when it comes to actual steps towards the 
realization of the project. Where does this irrationality arise from?
         First, if the bridge is constructed at the northwestern part of the border at Lom-Rast or 
Vidin-Calafat (as all independent surveys recommend), this will position Bucharest away 
from the main transport routes to Western Europe. 
         Second the more the bridge shifts to the west, the more it would decrease the transit 
length on Romanian territory. Acting as ‘irrational egoistic state’ Romania would prefer to 
preserve the status-quo, despite the pressures from the EU and most of the Balkans countries, 
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which are all interested in the existence of the alternative route. The Romanian political elites 
prefer to develop infrastructure along the corridor Budapest - Bucharest - Constanta –
Istanbul (see fig. 4), which will put Constanta Port in a key position;137 Another direction 
favored by Bucharest is the route ‘Budapest - Bucharest - Ruse - Sofia – Thessaloniki (see 
fig.4), which will maintain the long transit and Bucharest’s role as a key transport 
junction’.138     
         Third, as Yordanka Gancheva from the Institute of Market Economics wrote, for 
Romania ‘65 % of 1998 annual export is directed to EU. The trade volume with Bulgaria, 
Greece and Macedonia all together is negligible, and for this reason transport costs are not of 
paramount importance’. Thus the Romanian side does not have the impetus to develop the 
shortest southern connections, as they would only underestimate Bucharest and port of 
Constanta. Furthermore Romania has the interest to obstruct the second bridge on the 
Danube, as it ‘ will have bigger benefits from long-distance transits, rather than from 
establishing shortest trade routes.’139
         On the Third All European Ministerial Conference on Transport –Helsinki, 1997, where 
the map of the transport corridors was specified it was decided that Corridor IV should pass 
through Vidin-Calafat. However the Romanian side pushed that the route of Corridor IV 
‘should divert to Constanta as no. IV a’140 (see fig.1) Since then Romanian political elites 
further enhanced their obstruction of the second bridge, trying to invalidate the southern 
direction of Corridor IV to Thessaloniki and Istanbul and develop it only in the part, that 
diverts to Constanta. As an implication of that policy the first modern Romanian highway 
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was recently opened between Bucharest and Constanta and also in 1996 Romania has opened 
the new ferry ‘Eforie’ running between Constanta and port of Samsun in Turkey.141
         What Bucharest most obviously did not take into account was that after the war 
conflicts in Yugoslavia were over the natural trade flows would return along the shortest Via 
Militaris route from Istanbul-Sofia-Belgrade-Wien, circumventing Romania and excluding it 
from the ‘big geopolitical game’. Moreover after the normalization in Yugoslavia, the EU, 
the SPSEE and other international factors are much less inclined to financially support the 
bridge-project. As Gergana Dimitrova wrote the project ‘might seem to be losing its outward 
significance after the end of the Kosovo crisis and the disappearance of the pariah 
Yugoslavia’. 142
         This case is an argument in favor of the hypothesis that narrow-egoistic geopolitical 
planning obstructs the modernization and economic recovery of Balkan countries (in this case 
Bulgaria and Romania), as the second Danube bridge in 2003 (ten years after the initial 
project) is still existing only on paper. The two countries have missed substantial 
opportunities to attract some of the flows of the Via Militaris route, to receive generous 
support to implement the project from outside donors, such as EIB, the PHARE program in 
the period 1995-2000, at the time when the project was of high priority for the international 
community as an alternative route to the one through troubled Yugoslavia.  If the project was 
accomplished in that period, the economies of the two countries would suffer much slighter 
losses than the billion-dollar ones indicated from the embargo upon Yugoslavia and the 
hundred of millions, lost during the Kosovo crisis.143
        Most probably as a consequence of the latter developments there are some positive 
indications that the logic of economics could prevail over egoistic geopolitical considerations, 
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as after ten years of gridlock a Bilateral Agreement for the construction of a new bridge at 
Vidin-Calafat was signed on 5th June, 2000 and ratified on 6th April, 2001 by the parliaments 
of the two countries. However this was only achieved after Special Coordinator of the SPSEE 
Bodo Hombach declared that the project for the second Danube bridge is taken out of the 
competence of the bilateral relations Bulgaria-Romania and is a project of European primary 
political and economical concern. 
          If however, despite the signed agreements for construction and the exerted -pressure by 
the EU, the two countries continue to delay the completion of the project they will further 
calculate losses from financing, building of infrastructure, employment, profits both direct 
and indirect. 
2.2.3 Transport Corridor IV vs. Corridor X
The Corridor IV (marked with 
orange on fig.5) links Dresden 
(Germany) to Istanbul (Turkey) via 
Prague, Bratislava, Gjor, Budapest, 
Arad, Crajova, Sofia and Plovdiv. 
Ways diverge to provide links to 
Nuremberg, Vienna, Bucharest and 
FIGURE 5. RIVALRIES OVER THE NORTH-SOUTH DIRECTION:
PAN-EUROPEAN CORRIDOR N4 VS. VIA MILITARIS
Constanta (Corridor IVa). Corridor X (marked with brown on fig 5) crosses Salzburg 
(Austria), Ljubljana, Zagreb, Belgrade, Nis, Skopje, Veles and Thessalonica (Greece).144
         While corridor IV was regarded by EU Commission as a project of utmost importance 
during the Yugoslav conflicts as a conflict-bypass route, its relevance significantly 
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diminished at the end of the crisis. After the fall of the Milosevic regime, Greece initiated the 
creation of new transport corridor, and namely Corridor X at the Transport Conference in 
Helsinki (1997), which would link Belgrade with the Greek port of Thessaloniki. Such a 
development made European analysts believe that the routes of the two corridors are to the 
large extent overlapping.
         The second Greek initiative, that undermined Corridor IV was the project, later known 
as the ‘Dalmatian’ corridor (marked with red line on fig.5) linking the Italian port of Trieste 
to the Greek city of Igoumenista, following closely the Adriatic coast via Albania, 
Yugoslavia, Bosnia and Croatia, a project proposed in middle 1998 and estimated to 3 billion 
dollars.145
2.2.4 Brown Bears as Leading Political Actors: The Obstacles in the Opening of New 
Border Points between Bulgaria and Greece
         Until 1988, the 500 km common Bulgarian-Greek border was served by only one [!] 
border checking point, and namely Kulata-Promahon. The second checking point is officially 
opened as late as November 5, 1988.146
         On December 22, 1995 after the pressure exerted by the European Commission, the 
foreign ministers of Bulgaria and Greece, Georgi Pirinski and Karolos Papulias signed an 
agreement for the opening of three new checking points, along the common border and 
namely: Goce Delchev-Drama, Rudozem-Ksanti and Momchilgrad-Komotini, as well as the 
adjacent infrastructure. The agreement explicitly stated that the three new checking points 
should be commissioned not later than the end of 1998. The program PHARE donated 24 
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million German marks exclusively for the fast completion of the Goce Delchev -Drama 
checking point.
         It seemed that this could be one of the very few Balkan common infrastructure projects 
that can be implemented without the obstruction of any side. However it should not be 
disregarded that in the Balkan political game, even the local fauna could be a crucial player. 
The Greek ecology organization Arcturos decides to send a protest-letter to the EU 
Commission, where it expresses its concern that the new Goce Delchev-Drama checking 
point disturbs 'the ecological harmony in the region and threatens the population of the 
local…brown bears.' As a consequence the project is significantly delayed, as Brussels 
requires new route of the checking point in compliance with the environment.
         Ecological concerns are definitely something very important and not to be disregarded 
in infrastructure building. However in this particular case ecology appears to be used to 
intentionally delay the opening of the new checking point, as in that region there was hardly 
any brown bear population. Commenting on the case, the German magazine Spiegel writes:
Greeks had just invented something to delay the commissioning of the checking point. 
They said that tens or even hundreds of bears passed through exactly that spot…and the 
automobile traffic would disturb them… on the contrary… in the region there are two 
or three bear families at most and in the exact spot of the point a single bear has not 
been mentioned for years…147
After two more years of arguments, the new 'ecologically-correct' project provided for a 600 
meter-long tunnel, on the exact place between the two borders, that added 18 million marks 
more to the project's cost. The Special Coordinator for the Stability Pact Bodo Hombach 
commented that this bear-tunnel is 'senseless'.148
                                                
147
Tunnel für Meister Petz: Zwischen Bulgarien und Griechenland werden für den Tierschutz Unsummen aus 
EU-Steuergeldern verbuddelt, Spiegel, 48, (2000) quoted in Makedonia, 2 (2001)
148
 Ibid.
56
         The real motive behind this obstruction could have been the fear of the Greek side that 
eventual new checking point would provide for the increased communication between 
Bulgarians and the Slavophone minority in Greece. (population Greece, considers as 'Slavic-
speaking Greeks') On Bulgarian side the concerns from the new checking point opening 
might have been connected with the fact that the Bulgarian border region’s economically 
deprived population might emigrate to the Greek labor market. Whatever the reasons for the 
obstruction on Bulgarian or Greek side, such a policy is inconsistent with the Bulgarian 
statute as an acceding EU-state and Greece's as an established EU-member state and has 
negative consequences for the economies of both countries. It is even more irrational to relate 
these cases of obstruction and narrow-interest’s state planning to the broad framework of 
Euro-Atlantic integration: a framework all Balkan political elites proclaim affection to.
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Chapter 3
Clash of interests in the Energy Sector in the Balkans
Hell is other people – Jean-Paul Sartre
3.1 Nuclear Wars: One nuclear plant is not enough, two are too much
3.1.1 Kozloduy vs. Cernavoda 
         In 1970 after a bilateral agreement between the USSR and Bulgaria, commenced the 
construction of the first nuclear plant on the Balkans-NPP Kozloduy. More than 100 000[!] 
workers are involved in the massive project. The first two 440 MW units are put in 
commercial operation respectively in July 1974 and November 1975. Units 3 and 4 are put in 
commercial operation correspondingly in December 1980 and may 1982 and the last two 
Units 5 and 6 with reactors WWER-1000/V-320 are completed in September 1988 and 
December 1993.149 Upon its completion the nuclear plant at Kozloduy is being proclaimed 
the biggest pride of the Bulgarian industry.     
         In 1979, Romanian autocrat Nicolae Ceaucescu perceived the newly constructed 
Bulgarian plant as an impetus for his own ‘ grandiose dreams of building five or more 
reactors’ at the Cernavoda site on the river Danube. 150 ‘Canada’s export credit agency, the 
Export Development Corporation (EDC), provided a one billion US dollars- loan to Romania 
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for construction of the Cernavoda nuclear station.’151 Canada’s state nuclear company, 
Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL), cooperated with the forced construction of the 
plant but ‘these plans collapsed through technical incompetence and lack of funds.’152
Following the disintegration of the totalitarian system, further loans from the EDC and other 
Italian donors were taken for the completion of the plant. Twenty years after the initial 
negotiations started the result was the incredible 2.2 billion dollars cost of the project with 
only one unit put into exploitation, as late as April 1996. 
          The latter date could be traced as the starting point of the Bulgarian-Romanian ‘nuclear 
wars’. The opening of the single nuclear unit at Cernavoda (1996) coincided with pressures, 
exerted by EU on Bulgarian authorities to close the first four of the units at Kozloduy. 
Bulgarian political elites and the media suspected that there is a ‘conspiracy against Bulgaria’ 
and  ‘France and Canadian companies that have put money into Romania's sole nuclear plant 
at Cernavoda would like Romania to replace Bulgaria as a Balkan energy supplier,153
Furtermore ‘international pressures are exerted to close the Kozlodui nuclear power plant... 
coming mainly from Canada and Italy with the intention to recover ‘the billions invested in 
the plant in Cernavoda.’’154 The tension intensified to such an extent that when the Romanian 
president visited Bulgaria to attend the Greece-Bulgaria-Romania Trilateral Summit, the most 
significant daily Trud (Labor) ‘expressed its regrets for the fact that the Romanian President 
had not been welcomed with rotten tomatoes and eggs.’155
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         While it is clearly exaggerated that there is some kind of conspiracy against Bulgaria, it 
is also a clear fact that Balkan countries are one of the main initiators of the negative EU-
opinion. Greece, as the only EU-member in the region uses its influence to persuade the 
European Commission to exert pressure on Bulgaria for the early closure of the Kozloduy 
plant. According to Greek Environment, Town Planning and Public Works Minister- Costas 
Laliotis:
 The reactor's operation was a ‘huge mistake’ and said the European Union has adopted 
a proposal by the Greek ministry calling for Bulgaria to cease the reactor's operation, 
with domestic electricity demand covered by neighboring nations' grids. Mr. Laliotis 
said the EU has agreed to cover power transfer costs.156(emphasis mine)
         In 1999, the conflict intensified after an ultimatum from the European Commission to 
Bulgaria announcing that Bulgaria should ‘specify a schedule for the early closure of the four 
reactors at its Kozluduy nuclear power plant as a pre-condition for [initiation of] European 
Union accession talks.’157
         At present the nuclear plant at Kozloduy contributes from 44 to 46% of the total annual 
energy production in Bulgaria. Bulgarian energy system covers 45% of the constant deficit in 
the common energy balance of the Balkan countries, which is ‘accessed as a significant 
contribution to the economic stabilization of the region’158 and that makes the country the 
leading exporter of energy in South Eastern Europe.159
         However if the first four units of the Kozloduy plant are closed until 2006, as the 
European Commission insists, Bulgaria will turn from a major energy exporter to chief 
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importer in the region. As the political elites perceive that such a step would have strongly 
negative consequences for the Bulgarian economy, ‘Romania is... over eager to exploit the 
economic opportunities which it believes will ensue.’160 Furthermore Bulgaria not very 
modestly perceives itself as the ‘regional pivot of the Balkans’, that it is ‘a pole of stability’ 
and that ‘many people rely on Sofia for the solution of their own problems.’161 To a large 
extent this perception is empowered by the country’s leading position in the Balkan energy 
export market. Romania is also facing over capacity in electricity generation and decreasing 
home consumption162 That is why ‘Romania has pinned its hopes on the Kozloduy shutdown 
to help it become the leading regional electricity exporter.’163
         As part of its energy policy Bulgaria intentionally levied very high transit taxes for 
Romanian energy transport to Greece and Turkey, which made Romanian energy export 
economically incompetitive. Romanian Minister Basescu accused that ‘Sofia... [was] 
blocking for years Romania's plans to export electricity elsewhere in the Balkans.’ 164
Although there is a constant deficit of electricity in the Balkan market, Bulgaria obstructs the 
possibility for other energy exporters to cover this deficit by imposing high transit taxes. 
          On its part, Romanian political elites push for the closure of the Bulgarian plant, 
despite the fact that the first two units produce the cheapest energy in Europe with 1kW/h 
estimated under 2 cents165. The exporter who would replace the 45% Bulgarian share in the 
Balkan deficit coverage would most certainly introduce much higher prices, which would 
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calculate great economic losses to Greece, Turkey, Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), 
Macedonia and Bulgaria, which all would have to pay the new prices for their energy 
imports. The only ‘winner’ would be Romania. However, as a whole the region would 
become much more externally-energy-dependent as the single unit at Cernavoda would not 
be able to substitute for the four closed units at Kozloduy. Thus the Romanian, Yugoslavian 
and Greek political elites which persistently declare the Kozloduy nuclear plant as the 
‘biggest treat to the region’ would most certainly calculate significant economic losses from 
the eventual closure. Similarly to the transport policies in the region, in the energy sector 
despite the declared commitment to the common markets, integration of economic policies, 
etc., the irrationalities of Homo Balcanicus prevail over the economic logic.
         If a country in the Balkans is natural resource-abundant or has some competitive 
advantage, the political elites of neighboring countries perceive this advantage as a treat, as a 
target of obstruction and try to diminish it by trying to either ‘construct their own replica’ of 
the advantage or hinder it by all possible means. This is completely heterodox to basic 
economic laws, and most certainly the attempt to replicate other’s competitive advantage, 
without own resource endowments and economic sufficiency leads to inconsistent results 
with meager performance, which most certainly obstruct the modernization and economic 
recovery in the respective societies.
         This energy rivalry seems even more irrational after on 15 November 2002 ten 
Southeast European Governments signed upon the agreement of establishing a common 
electricity market by the year 2005, as a step of its integration to the common electricity 
market of the EU.166Such peculiarity is not left unnoticed even by local scientific circles:
Although both Romania and Bulgaria ostensibly agreed on September 10 to link all 
national energy grids and thus create a regional electricity market in the Balkans, the 
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'power war', as the media have called the latest conflict between the two countries, 
rumbles on and reflects a long history of economic competition.167
          Competition, which is inconsistent with the advanced EU-accession-status of both 
countries. Furthermore narrow political interests and the consequent obstruction prevents 
both countries to become together the major transit point between two large electric grids. 
Balkan countries’ grid is still connected with the United Power Systems (UPS) electric grid 
of former COMECON countries through Moldova, Ukraine and Russia.168 With their 
accession to the EU Bulgaria and Romania would inevitably be connected to the main 
European  grid, and namely: Union for the Coordination of Production and Transmission of 
Electricity (UCPTE). Thus, as Georgy Ganev wrote it would become possible ‘to transfer 
large quantities of electricity between Russia and the Ukraine on the one side, and UCPTE on 
the other, without endangering the performance standards of the latter’169, making Balkan 
countries  ‘the cheapest and readiest bridge between the power systems of Europe and 
Russia’170, calculating huge transit tax-profits and enhancing their home gas infrastructure 
and consumption. However such a favorable opportunity might well be eliminated due to the 
present lack of cooperation, the imposing of high taxes to a neighbor’s gas transit, the 
egoistic profit-pursuit. Such an outcome would have enormous negative implications on 
Balkan transition economies: losses from unrealized transit profits, the incapability to 
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enhance ‘performance by improving the capacity utilization’, inability to reduce fluctuations, 
reduce cost and pollution.171
3.2 Oil and Gas Pipelines:‘The Dawn of a second Middle East’172 and the battle 
over the transit routes from there
         World’s oil-demand-dependency on the Persian Gulf reserves rates at 40 % and is 
expected to rise by 2010 up to 52 %, if no alternative sources are developed.173 The oil crises 
of 1973 and 1979 pushed developed countries to search for alternative sources in order to 
become more energy independent. With the fall of the communist system in the new 
geopolitical international order, the regions of Caucasus and Central Asia were recognized as 
part of the ‘larger belt’ of countries belonging to the Euro-Atlantic space. Such a 
development provided a solution to the Western’s dependency problem, by allowing for 
access to the region’s ‘hundreds of billions of barrels of untapped oil reserves and trillions of 
cubic feet of natural gas [that] lay underneath the rugged, barren, inhospitable landscape of 
Central Asia around the Caspian Sea coastline and the Caucasus region.’ which could be an 
alternative to either Russian or Middle East supplies. 
         However ‘the transportation...from the distant and land-locked countries of the Caspian 
to Western Europe and Western hemisphere (USA) is the biggest challenge for the Western 
oil companies operating in the region.’174 The crowded and narrow Bosporus and 
Dardanelles straits in Turkey, and the latter’s policy for restricting oil tankers-traffic brought 
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up the issue for transportation of Caucasian and Central Asian oil through pipelines reaching 
the West Coast of the Black Sea and subsequently to the Western markets.175
         The problems with the Bosporus require further scrutinizing. After the March, 2001 
completion of the Tengiz-Novorossiisk (CPC) pipeline that linked the Kazakhstan fields with 
the Russian Black Sea port, Russia managed to divert some of the oil deliveries through its 
territory, thus securing its own transit share in ‘the big oil game’. By 2015 estimates indicate 
that Russia’s oil export through Black Sea ports are expected to be not less than 50 million 
tons annually. By the same year, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan are expected to supply to the 
western markets 100-120 million tons annually.176 Also according to estimates ‘even under 
the most optimal arrangements, Bosporus is incapable of letting through more than 70-80 
million tons of oil a year.’177 Therefore by the end of the next decade more than 100 million 
tons of export oil-shipments could be in danger of being disrupted. 
         This is what led to the immense need of pipeline projects bypassing the Bosporus 
straits. At least four projects were considered as a solution to the problem, and namely 
Odessa-Brody-Gdansk, Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan, Burgas-Alexandroupolis, Burgas-Vlore and the 
fifth Constanta –Trieste was rejected as it was considered economically insufficient.178As 
analyst Ivan Grybanov wrote ‘it cannot be ruled out that only one out of these four projects 
will survive under the present conditions of slowing oil demand growth on the world 
markets.’179 This was one of the main reasons for the subsequent intense competition among 
Balkan countries for their ‘own’ project. The projects Burgas-Alexandroupolis, Burgas-Vlore 
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and Constanta –Trieste pass through the Balkans and they are scrutinized in the sections 
below.
3.2.1 Russia and the Burgas-Alexandroupolis Project
         In 1995 Russia initiated the creation of Transbalkan Oil Pipeline company to ‘prepare 
feasibility studies and 
eventually to lay a 
pipeline from Bulgaria's 
Black Sea port [of] Burgas 
to the Greek port 
Alexandroupolis on the
FIGURE 6. ALTERNATIVE BOSPORUS-BYPASS PIPELINE PROJECTS ON THE BALKANS
 Aegean.’180(marked with orange on fig.6) Such a project combining oil tanker transport from 
the Russian port of Novorosiisk to Burgas and then with pipeline to Alexandroupolis would 
allow for Kazakh and Russian oil to bypass the overcrowded Bosporus straits and provide an 
alternative route to the Western markets. Bulgaria and Greece would largely benefit from the 
project, as the transit taxes would be significant. The Transbalkan Oil Pipeline Company was 
scheduled to start its work at the end of 1995 and complete the project by 1998 the latest. 
However most definitely such precision in planning and timing did fail to consider the Balkan 
inconsistencies, as Bulgaria and Greece, shortly after signing, started arguing over the 
percentage share in the company. While Russia has secured 50% for itself, the two Balkan 
countries could not agree for the remaining percents. Greece insisted that Bulgaria should not 
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have more than 5% of the shares, as it cannot provide sufficient funding.181 This has lead to 
seven-year gridlock of the project with significant economic losses, mainly from unrealized 
transit taxes, calculated both for Greece and Bulgaria.  An agreement between the two sides 
was reached as late as November 2002, when finally Bulgaria, Russia and Greece reached a 
political decision regarding the equal participation of the countries in the construction of the 
Burgas-Alexandroupolis pipeline.
         The Burgas –Alexandroupolis Project pipeline (orange color on fig.6) would consist of 
a 280 km-long pipeline with a capacity of 15,000,000 tonnes/year, planned to reach an 
optimum of 35,000,000 tonnes/year. The pipeline is estimated to cost approximately 660 
million dollars and further 300 million for adjacent infrastructure at the ports of Burgas and 
Alexandroupolis. According to the agreement from 2002 each country had to invest equal 
share of 220 million dollars. The 2002 -Agreement between Bulgaria and Greece might lead 
to the conclusion that after a decade of discord, the Balkan countries might have finally 
learned to respect the laws of economics, where efficiency and competitive advantages 
dominate over egoistic geopolitical concerns and narrow-interest planning. Unfortunately this 
is not the case, as evidenced by the following sections.
3.2.2 USA and the AMBO Burgas-Vlorë Project
          In 1996 the newly established Albanian-Macedonian-Bulgarian Oil Corporation 
(AMBO) initiated the Burgas-Vlorë project. The AMBO Burgas-Vlorë line (marked with is 
898 km long and has a planned capacity of 35,000,000 tonnes per year.182 The estimated 
price of the project is 1.13 billion US dollars. This project was directly supported by the 
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American government within the framework of the South Balkan Development Initiative 
(SBDI) of the Trade and Development Agency (TDA). It closely follows the route of 
transport Corridor VIII from Black Sea to the Adriatic (passing consequently through 
Bulgaria, Albania and Macedonia). What is peculiar about this project is that ‘exclusive 
rights for the AMBO pipeline and corridor VIII were granted to the Anglo-American AMBO 
group.’183 The latter is declared the only party ‘allowed to build the planned pipeline from 
Burgas to Vlore’and also AMBO has the sole rights to negotiate with creditors and 
investors.184 Some analysts like Michel Chossudovsky write that this project, which is 
strongly backed by the US government ‘supports the interests of the oil giants, including BP-
Amoco-ARCO, Chevron and Texaco.’185 The project had reached a very advanced stage, but 
the conflict in Kosovo slowed down its implementation. However AMBO has initiated 
fundraising campaign in US and elsewhere and ‘once financing is secured, the pipeline could 
be constructed in four years.’186        
         The AMBO-pipeline project is fiercely opposed by Romania and Greece and to a 
smaller extent by Turkey.187 The former two are ardently lobbying for thealternative projects, 
passing through their own territories. Furthermore some analysts believe that Greece had 
finally agreed to the equal share for the Bulgarian side in the Burgas-Alexandroupolis project 
under ‘the treat’ of the rapidly advancing Burgas-Vlorë project. Furthermore Greece is 
hoping that if the prognosis for ‘slowing oil demand growth on the world markets’ turns out 
to be correct, if the Greek project is commissioned first it will make the AMBO project 
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economically insufficient. Greece hopes that if construction of the former project predates the 
latter, the Bulgarian side will discontinue its political support for the ‘rival’ Bulgarian-
Macedonian-Albanian AMBO project, which is a required pre-requisite for its 
commissioning.188 However while seven years the AMBO and Burgas-Alexandroupolis 
pipeline projects were in constant rivalry (with Greece supporting the latter and Bulgaria 
constantly changing its support), Romanian political elites surprised everybody with their 
alternative project Constanta-Trieste.
3.2.2 EU and the Constanta-Trieste Project
         Despite that the Romanian Foreign Minister Andrei Plesu has declared in 1998 ‘that 
Romania's policy on Caspian oil transit is based on regional cooperation’ and also ‘closer 
cooperation rather than competition will make the transit bids of Ukraine, Romania and 
Bulgaria stronger’189, he initiated a new fierce competition on the Balkans. Taking advantage 
of the gridlock in the Bulgarian-Greek negotiations over the Burgas-Alexandroupolis 
pipeline, Romania revived (the previously rejected as inefficient) project for a route, passing 
through its territory from the port of Constanta on the Black Sea to the port of Trieste on the 
Adriatic (marked with blue on fig.6) In the year, when Bulgaria and Greece finally agreed 
upon the percentage shares in the consortium, Romania intensified its efforts to provide 
funding for its route, through different sources such as The U.S. Trade and Development 
Agency (TDA) ,190despite the fact that the route passes from an extremely long, difficult and 
volatile area through the Carpathian Mountains and the Western Balkans and cuts off the 
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Mediterranean Sea.’191 Thus the latter characteristics make the Romanian project much less 
economically viable than Burgas-Alexandroupolis project and the AMBO projects with its 
1300km length, compared to 280 and 900km respectively. Despite 63% of the infrastructure 
of Constanta-Trieste exists, its completion would cost 1billion US dollars, as much as AMBO 
and twice as much as Burgas-Alexandroupolis project. From the technical data is clear that 
the Romanian proposal is not motivated by ‘most shortest and profitable routes, situated 
according to where the natural geographical morphology of the Balkans is most facilitating to 
such projects’192, but by the Romanian geopolitical desire to attract the routes of the Caspian 
gas solely through its territory despite the fact that its project is not economically efficient. 
Greece perfectly aware of the limited local and external funds for the Bosporus- bypass 
projects tried to discredit the Romanian project in front of EU donors, funding institutions, 
public opinion. In this respect the statement of Greek Minister of Economy and Finance 
Nicos Christodoulakis, regarding the Constanta-Trieste project is characteristic ‘ For such 
issues, the map itself usually gives the best answer.’193
         In the era of the Dawn of New Middle East (Caucasus oil fields), the interests 
surrounding Balkan transit pipelines are an immense interplay of global oil giants’ interests, 
EU, US and Russian attention. However it cannot be ruled out that the Balkan countries have 
enough leverage to influence the different projects’ implementation. Furthermore even if the 
fact that the Burgas-Alexandroupolis project is backed by Russia, the AMBO by the US-
administration, and the Constanta-Trieste by the EU194 is taken into account, it cannot be 
denied that Balkan political elites use their limited influence to ardently obstruct rivalry 
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projects and lobby for ‘their own’, despite feasibility studies, economic efficiency prognosis 
and technical parameters data.
Conclusion
         Humanity is entering the realm of a Third Wave World. Or it might soon witness the 
end of civilization. It does not necessarily have to sound so apocalyptic, but the 
transformation processes the World is undergoing at the wake of the new Millennium are a 
plausible reason to speak for an emerging New Order. No matter if it is called ‘Integration’, 
‘Globalization’or ‘Transnationalization’, these are all different aspects of one process. While 
we still cannot speak of the ‘death of geopolitics’ and the ‘birth of chronopolitics’, the 
prevailing scholarly discourse signifies that globalization undermines the classical value of 
geography. 
             Regional blocs undermine the classical realist vision of states as constitutive parts of 
the international system. In regional blocs, such as EU there is already ‘higher authority that 
can constrain or channel the behavior of states’ and facilitate cooperation as states no longer 
operate in chaos. The old realist argument justifying the logic of relative gains, that ‘security 
and well-being ultimately rest on their ability to mobilize [states’] own resources against 
external threat’ is no longer fully adequate. Regional blocs promote cooperation and advance 
the logic of absolute gains.
         After the fall of the communist regimes in Eurasia, the Balkan region was recognized as 
part of the future Euro-Atlantic space with short and middle-term perspectives for full 
integration into the EU. The latter initiated major pan-European transport and energy projects 
to facilitate Eastern Europe and in particular Balkan’s economic recovery and integration into 
its structures. Ten years after the projects’ adoption they still remain in their infancy stage 
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despite the cooperation facilitating international regimes, generous access to funding and 
regular pressure exerted by the EU. 
         Present Balkan political elites are ardently proclaiming that they would adhere to the 
values of integrating and globalizing Europe in their Balkan policy, while de facto employing 
the ‘arsenal’ of geopolitical egoistic planning. Such geopolitical planning in inter-Balkan 
relations, which is embedded in the geopolitical thinking of present Balkan political elites, 
obstructs the democratization and economic recovery of these societies. Despite the 
numerous attempts and initiatives by the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, the EU, the 
European Investment Bank and other institutions concerned, aimed to accelerate the 
completion of these corridors, there has not been much substantial action taken in that 
direction. After a decade most of the projects are still in their infancy stage due to obstruction 
or lack of support by neighboring countries. 
         Despite their opening towards the EU, Balkan countries still prefer to ‘close off and 
control earth space, resources and population’ among themselves, which is consistent with 
Blouet’s old geopolitical thinking tendency, as well as with the concepts of Ratzelian 
Geopolitik and Cold War geopolitics. 
         Probably the main reason for such state of affairs is the very large geopolitical stake 
involved in the transport and energy-infrastructure routes and the great hopes Balkan 
countries set in the construction of large-scale pan-European infrastructure projects, ‘believed 
to help them get out of their state of crisis as it was the case in the US and Germany in the 
1930's’ following the Great Depression. Another argument explains the political obstruction 
with geopolitical interests of external actors. This is most certainly evidenced in the 
alternative oil pipeline projects, where the US supports financially and politically the AMBO 
project, Russia –the Burgas-Alexandroupolis route and the EU the Trieste-Constanta project, 
as well as in the conflict between Corridor IV vs Corridor X and the Dalmatian diagonal. 
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Historical legacy also might still have some influence on Balkan elites, as countries’ current 
doctrines, present transport and energy strategies have incorporated some elements from the  
old compromised national doctrines and some other elements consistent with Blouet’s 
geopolitical thinking.
         This research focused mainly on the irrationality of current Balkan political elites in the 
implementation of the pan-European transport and energy sectors. Namely the situation of 
discord was explored in the broader context of European integration. It also explored 
geopolitical thinking, as variable causing discord. Although not the main concentration of the 
research- historical legacies, great economical significance and external actors’ influence 
were indicated as possible explanatory variables to the geopolitical thinking, consistent with 
Blouet’s theory. A shortcoming of this research should be acknowledged, and namely- the 
depth of exploration of national doctrines. It could have been more complex and elaborated.
This is a consequence of the fact that such documents are usually not officially published, or 
distributed only in specific circles. Operationalization of such a variable as historical legacy 
is also a significant challenge.
         While there is sufficient scholarship on the Balkan cooperation and regional 
organization programs after the Cold War, as well on the implementation of common 
infrastructure projects, research on the latter’s obstruction from Balkan political elites is 
rather scarce. Reasons for such a situation of discord are even more neglected. Further 
scholarship might concentrate on the reasons for the present state of disagreement and lack of 
cooperation with introducing more explanatory variables, as well as further exploration of the 
historical legacy argument and respective countries’ historical and present national doctrines. 
Such a research might contribute to better understanding of the present Balkan irrationalities 
and to the implementation of alternative programs or projects that would provide solution to 
the problems. The Greek Megali Idea (Great Idea), Serbian Nachertanie (Strategy) and the 
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present Bulgarian National Doctrine: National Strategic Programs and Greek Unity and 
Lobbying of the Hellenes around the World require special attention.
         Most probably in a decade we will witness a fully EU-integrated Balkan region in an 
even further globalized world. Most probably this will happen even earlier. Most probably. 
Let us pray for this homo Balkanikus of the future…
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Appendices:
A. Pan-European Transport Corridors in the Balkans: routes and maps
Corridor IV
Link EU-South-eastern Europe
Road; rail; Danube ferry link; airports; ports; combined transport. Total length: 3.258 km
Berlin
Dresden
Nuremberg
Germany
Prague
Brno
Czech Republic
Vienna (rail) Austria
Bratislava Slovak Republic
Györ
Budapest
Hungary
Arad
Craiova
Bucharest
Constantza
Romania
Sofia
Pflovdiv
Bulgaria
Thessaloniki Greece
Omenio
Istanbul
Turkey
Corridor VII
Waterway route on the Danube from Germany to the Black Sea; connects up with the North Sea 
via the Rhine and the Main
Germany
Austria
Bratislava Slovak Republic
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Györ-Gönyü Hungary
Croatia
Serbia
Ruse
Lom
Bulgaria
Moldova
Ukraine
Constantza Romania
Corridor VIII
Road; rail; expansion of port of Durrës; combined transport in Bitola; Length: 1.300 km
Durrës
Tirana
Albania
Skopje
Bitola
FYR Macedonia
Sofia
Dimitrovgrad
Burgas
Varna
Bulgaria
Corridor IX
Road; rail ; port expansion
The Council in Essen (1994) declared the link Helsinki-St. Petersburg-Moscow as prioritary
Total length: 6 500 km
Helsinki Finland
Vyborg
St Petersburg
Pskov
Moscow
Kaliningrad
Russia
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Kiev
Ljubasevka
Odessa
Ukraine
Chisinau Moldova
Bucharest Romania
Vilnius
Kaunas
Klaipeda
Lithuania
Minsk Belarus
Alexandroupolis Greece
Dimitrovgrad
Ormenio
Bulgaria
Corridor X
Road; rail ; Length: 2 360 km
Salsburg
Graz
Austria
Zagreb Croatia
Belgrade
Nis
Veles
Thessaloniki
Bitola
Skopje
FYR Macedonia
Ljubljiana
Maribor
Slovenia
Budapest Hungary
Belgrade Serbie
Novi Sad
Nis
Sofia
(Corr IV - Istanbul)
Bulgaria
Veles
Florina
Via Egnatia
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B. (Bosporus Bypass) Oil Pipeline Projects on the Balkans: technical data
Name/Location
Route
Crude 
Capacity
Length
Estimated 
Cost/Inve
stment
Status
Albanian 
Macedonian 
Bulgarian Oil 
(AMBO) Pipeline
Burgas (Bulgaria) 
via Macedonia to 
Vlore (Albania) on 
Adriatic coast
750,000 bbl/d 
(could be 
expanded to 1-
million bbl/d)
560 miles
(898km)
$850 million 
to $1.1 
billion
Construction delayed, 
(proposed 2001-2002) as 
financing is arranged. As by 
2003, construction has not yet 
started.
Burgas 
Alexandropoulis 
(Trans-Balkan Oil 
Pipeline)
Burgas to 
Alexandropoulis 
(Greece) on the 
Aegean Sea coast
Proposed 
600,000 bbl/d 
to 800,000 
bbl/d
178 miles
(280km)
$600 million
After 7 years of negotiations 
new agreement signed in 2002 
between Bulgaria, Greece, and 
Russia. As by 2003, 
construction has not yet started.
Constanta-Trieste 
Pipeline
Constanta 
(Romania) via 
Hungary, Slovenia, 
and/or Croatia to 
Trieste (Italy) on 
the Adriatic Sea 
coast. Omisalj 
(Croatia) also has 
been proposed as a 
terminus.
660,000 bbl/d
855 miles
(1300km)
$900 million
Feasibility studies completed; 
financing still to be arranged.
Jan. 2003: agreement signed in 
Bucharest between Romania, 
Yugoslavia and Croatia. As by 
2003, construction has not yet 
started.
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